So what do we all think of Hegseth and senior cabinet member using Signal app

[Utley1992]

Way late to the party, but no one should be surprised by this. This is the expected results of what happens when blind loyalty is the one and only criteria needed to work in this administration. It's exactly what the right claims DEI hires do. If you fire anyone who is competent and knows what they're doing in place of an alcoholic rapist who came from cable television, but is a Trump sycophant, you can expect incompetence. The right for years screamed about Hillary using a private server, which she shouldn't have done, but will twist yalls brains into a pretzel trying to justify how accidentally adding someone without security clearance into a group chat about war plans. It's ridiculous. This will be far from the biggest scandal in the Trump administration, but it does highlight a few things: 1. How incompetent this administration will be with private intel. 2. How little accountability they will take for their actions. 3. How the right media sphere doesn't actually have any principles. That includes many of you here. There is zero reason to even discuss how this would be getting discussed on Fox and OAN had this happened under a democratic administration

 

[atlanta cock#]

Way late to the party, but no one should be surprised by this. This is the expected results of what happens when blind loyalty is the one and only criteria needed to work in this administration. It's exactly what the right claims DEI hires do. If you fire anyone who is competent and knows what they're doing in place of an alcoholic rapist who came from cable television, but is a Trump sycophant, you can expect incompetence. The right for years screamed about Hillary using a private server, which she shouldn't have done, but will twist yalls brains into a pretzel trying to justify how accidentally adding someone without security clearance into a group chat about war plans. It's ridiculous. This will be far from the biggest scandal in the Trump administration, but it does highlight a few things: 1. How incompetent this administration will be with private intel. 2. How little accountability they will take for their actions. 3. How the right media sphere doesn't actually have any principles. That includes many of you here. There is zero reason to even discuss how this would be getting discussed on Fox and OAN had this happened under a democratic administration

LOL.

I have no facts other than there are a lot of conflicting statements. Some of you confidently saying this was unexpected may end up eating your words.

 

[Utley1992]

I have no facts

I know

Some of you confidently saying this was unexpected may end up eating your words.

Here is a good example. My first sentence was how this shouldn't be surprising.

 

[celticdawg]

@Moosefish - Here's your response to me:

If, despite her military background, she truly believes that it was "so clearly classified info", then she is a complete idiot (I don't believe so), a liar for political purposes, or actually hasn't closely read the contents of the Chat. There is no other explanation.

I have no reason to think Tammy Duckworth is a complete idiot either given her career. I would think she had read the entire Chat given her background and presumable part of similar Chats. She could certainly be making a political statement but don't know her well. I can believe it. But to put things in perspective, this is just one person who is not directly involved in the incident so her comment isn't too relevant, but she does come from a different perspective.

I don't want to rehash everything (I appreciate your thoroughness in responding to various posts) but here's my bigger picture. I believe we agree there needs to be an investigation of a number of items related to this incident. Unfortunately, it gets "debated" in public without all the facts being known and the country is so much more divided that it's hard to find common ground.

There has been a semantics game with how to describe this (referring to the classified issue). Why can't the officials who are involved in this describe things as well as you have. I understand what you are saying but will wait for some official word (if it actually comes). It appears to me that there is some confusion between when the app can be used and which phones people were using. It doesn't seem smart to be part of this while you are in Russia, but maybe that's not a problem. These questions can be answered and hopefully we get something definite from the government. I think we all agree that a reporter should not have been part of the Chat and we really need to know the truth (assuming it doesn't comprise any security issues).

My biased issue with what we have heard from the President and those involved with this is that it's been so inconsistent. Why isn't everybody on the same page. It doesn't give confidence in how this is being handled or in some of these top people. And how can the President have not known about this when questioned? And how does he not know about the missing soldiers? (Rhetorical questions). Plenty of time for things to get sorted out.

 

[willdup]

Sorry, this is going to be long.

I'm going to give you (and others that disagree w/ my "take" on this subject) the benefit of the doubt, and reiterate the information I have provided in what I hope is a more clear and concise manner. Please read my entire response before replying to anything. I also request the courtesy of quoting only what you're responding to. Otherwise, with a post this long I have to guess 😂

My position has remained consistent:

Someone added Goldberg to a Signal chat. That was bad. Goldberg alleged secret war plans were discussed. That’s false. No classified information was divulged. Should Goldberg have been added to the chat? No. Very bad mistake. That made this a OPSEC issue and an OPSEC issue, only. Did the OPSEC issue turn into anything worse? No, thankfully.

Words being used here are black & white. They all have very specific meanings. Classified has a very specific and defined threshold. The Signal Chat did not cross it. I looked at the Current CENTCOM Classification Guide today. I would share it, but it is not on a network you have access to (although it would now fall under CUI, even though it had the no-longer used "Unclassified" marking. No big deal).

However, the truth is self-evident: Classification Guides are available to all of Congress. Every member has a military aide. If you believe that not a single congressional staffer or reporter with a source with access didn't try and run the content of the released chat through an applicable classification guide and/or that the administration didn't do the same, I would respectfully argue that opinion ignores even basic logic.

There were two days of hearings and not a single person provided a reference from any classification guide that would indicate any of what was said in that chat crossed the Classified threshold. In fact, those involved provided specifics that would have caused it to cross the threshold. Again, black & white. Specific types of information. You don't have to believe me on any of this. But, the accuracy of what I have told you is clear because of what was not provided: Any reference to a specific black/white crossed line.

The same goes for any argument against using Signal in the way they did, including the DoD memo you reference below in a quote I respond to. Every necessary tool to do so is available to every elected critic.

If anybody can provide concrete official guidance on the classified nature of what was in there, I will absolutely retract all my commentary on this matter and admit I was wrong. But, despite specifically looking for it, I have yet to find it.

But, what have we gotten instead? Sensational rants and mischaracterizations of what "classified" is. Bad "what ifs" of what "could" have happened because this is an OPSEC violation. What they are doing are highlighting why OPSEC is very, very important. Those criticisms are correct: All those bad things could happen anytime OPSEC is violated.

But, an OPSEC violation does not mean the conversation was inappropriate, like actual Classified information would have been.

Waltz said: “I take full responsibility” for the error. Good. Find out what happened, fix it, and don't let it happen again. If that means no more Signal, go for it.

The CIA, NSA, FBI, etc. use Signal to communicate. Why? Because it’s a highly encrypted, highly secure communication medium. Is it perfect? Can it be exploited if you don't stay vigilant from those exploitations? Obviously. That's why actual Classified information isn't allowed. It's actually perfect for "Sensitive" information, to use the current word of choice.

The Atlantic story raised questions about the use of Signal. Obviously, there are times when you might use it and other times you wouldn't. That's why some matters were being discussed on the "high side" via classified channels.

Bottom line? You always want to be careful with sensitive information, and the Trump team has admitted the mistake of Jeffrey Goldberg being added to the chat. The next step is to prevent OPSEC violations of this type again.



1. Everything in her tweet, outside of the incorrect statement by an anonymous source, is a description of OPSEC, which I've already addressed. Other opinions she got seem to be based on supposition instead of actual knowledge of what was in the Chat. As I said: This is a black & white issue.

2. There has been plenty of things Griffin has said I agree with and at least two very specific incidents she has reported on (that I have first-hand knowledge of) that she has gotten 100% wrong. Her being at Fox carries no more weight in your argument. If you want to go in that direction, you don't get to disagree with anything Scott Jennings on CNN says. Works both ways, sir.



I try my best to separate fact and my opinion. I also try to provide evidence for my opinions. If someone wants to disagree with it, I hope they provide contradicting evidence. Someone dismissing it without providing counterevidence to what I said/provided is very frustrating.



Waiting on my youngest to get ready for school 🤣



Nobody is objective will. I have pointed out more than once I will "defend" parts of something I don't necessarily agree with because I find the logic attacking it to be inadequate. I enjoy any discussion and particularly enjoy the research. I particularly enjoy research papers. Maybe I need to go back to school 😝

I have disagreed with Trump and certainly other "right leaning" individuals on this very board many times. If my responses seem to be consistently in defense of Trump and Republicans, I will argue (because I'm the one making the arguments) it's simply a result of how far you and others have drifted towards the illogical leanings of the progressive left: i.e. Trump and anybody associated with him can only be wrong, no room for nuance and certainly no chance to admit something he's done might actually be "good".

Frankly, your framing of me above is borderline insulting. If you want to discuss predicting someone's response: I recommend you take a long, hard look in the mirror. Any semblance of nuance or difference in your opinion from the daily musings of the most biased of left-leaning media seems to have vanished. I hope I'm wrong.



With all due respect, you have no idea what you're talking about. I've already addressed everything you're talking about here and you still stick to nonsensical points.



If you can provide an example of non-classified breaches like you describe that led to prison terms, I'd like to see it and discuss it. Otherwise, it's completely irrelevant to this discussion.



This is full-on projection.



As discussed above, that certainly wasn't an accurate counter argument. It was a mis framing of OPSEC as equal to a breach of classified information.



If any of these "more respected voices" are saying that there was classified information in that Chat, then they are simply wrong, no matter how much more respected they are (not exactly a high level to achieve 😜)



I have had two major issues with every single SecDef I have served under (and it's been a ton): Their focus on the politics of the DoD (which includes their ever-present close ties to defense contractors) and their universal lack of focus truly taking care of those in uniform. Hegseth is certainly a non-conventional pick and my hope is that he is better in both of those areas than his predecessors. If he is not up for the job, I hope he is removed.



This is my big problem with lots of will's comments on Hegseth and most anything Trump-related.



If, despite her military background, she truly believes that it was "so clearly classified info", then she is a complete idiot (I don't believe so), a liar for political purposes, or actually hasn't closely read the contents of the Chat. There is no other explanation.



That's not actually "proof" it's not a secure channel, as spillage and leakage from absolutely secure channels still happen sometimes. I can make a mistake adding crypto to a secure radio, not do it correctly, and spill state secrets over an open channel.

What is PROVES is that nothing is secure from plain human error.



Interesting how Goldberg decided to sit on all of this until literally the day before some involved were scheduled to appear before Congress. I'm sure that wasn't a factor at all and I'm probably not allowed to point that out due to 'bias'🙄



This is simply incorrect. Signal was was approved to discuss unclassified information. There are best practices for OPSEC, but even some of the types of information they provided in that Chat I could theoretically provide over an open line. I don't want to get into some long discussion about this. But, I think you are making a lot of assumptions with no basis in fact or actual policies.





Hegseth has every right to actively or passively rescind a 2023 memo from the very organization he's currently in charge of, considering the CISA Best Practices referenced in the article came out after the DoD memo and the DoD then or now had every right to change that policy.

Are you arguing that a SecDef doesn't have the right to change the policy of his own department, especially with new information on how to safeguard information within Signal?

I'd actually like to see that memo, for a lot of reasons.



I strongly disagree that I did not provide reasonable justification, previously. I thought my example provided ample justification.

If you disagree, I have the name and number of a then one-star who you are free to call and ask why he decided to include the Medical Group, Mission Support Group, Maintenance Group, Comptroller Squadron, Force Support Squadron, Dental Squadron, Communications Squadron, Civil Engineering Squadron, Logistics Readiness Squadron, Contracting Squadron, Air Mobility Squadron, JAG, and the Host Nation Coordination Cell Commanders in a pre-strike brief that was 'before the operation'...and not just the Operations Group Commander. Not reasonable? Ok.

But, I stand by my point.



That's completely false. Israel’s complaint to the US was their concern over the broader intelligence exposure and not a specific outing of an agent’s identity. That would be the "source" portion of what would be classified. Again...a OPSEC issue.

If I'm wrong, I'm sure you can provide the name and a link to that name.😜

I'll open with a quote that hopefully sets the table for my response.

“To know that you do not know is the best. To think you know when you do not is a disease. Recognizing this disease as a disease is to be free of it.” – Lao Tzu

I acknowledge that your knowledge of this topic greatly exceeds mine. Huge revelation, I'm sure.

I also sincerely appreciate your posts and the research you put into them.

But I still think you are biased (I certainly am) and that you are effective at finding the information that supports your desired end argument versus reaching a conclusion based on the facts. So, let's see if I am correct.

Your argument seems to hinge on the assertion that the information shared by Hegseth was not classified. I disagree.

My argument is supported by three documents.

1) My research suggests that the Department of Defense Manual 5200.01 is a cornerstone document for the DOD Information Security Program, governing how classified information is identified, handled, protected and declassified.

Vol. 1 of the above referenced manual states:
“Information shall be classified if its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security, including military plans, weapons systems, or operations.”

Here is an excerpt of what Hegseth shared:

This does not include the fact that he shared intelligence regarding a human target that was specific and apparently upset the ally that likely gathered it and shared it with us.

I think that leaves three possible rebuttals for you.

1. The document I referenced isn't relevant.
2. The information shared by Hegseth, if publicly disclosed prior to the operation, would not "reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security...”.
3. Point 2 isn't relevant, as nothing is classified until it is officially deemed as classified by a classification authority.

Perhaps there is another rebuttal I haven't identified. I'm open to your arguments.

2) Executive Order 13526 Classified National Security Information

This EO identifies information that could "reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security", including military plans, weapons systems, or operations as classified.

So perhaps this EO isn't relevant, but if so, what has it been replaced by?

3) Uniform Code of Military Justice

• Article 92 addresses failure to obey an order, which includes mishandling classified information.
• Article 134 covers a range of offensives, including unauthorized disclosure of information that could harm national security, even if not technically labeled classified.

I'm trying to keep this tight, so I'll leave my argument there and give you a chance to reply.

 

[ToddBburn]

When I said a 2000 word essay wouldn’t change my mind, that wasn’t meant to be taken as a challenge.

In case you are wondering, you came in at 2721 words, including the quotes.

I don’t have the time to fully respond, but I’ll address one point.

I do respect you as a poster, but you are as biased as anyone else on here. I didn’t exclude myself from that characterization and it was not intended as an insult, just recognition of the fact that as far as I can remember, you have been extremely consistent in justifying anything associated with Trump, just as I have been consistent with criticism.

Our recent exchange on the J6 pardons just confirmed what I already suspected.

I’ll carve out some time tomorrow to respond, although I’ll pre-concede that my word count will surely pale in comparison.

From the perch that you seem to post from you do appear to be casting judgement on many. Sadly your perch is just as flawed as mine and everyone else. This is a worthless thread because neither side can check their emotion or try not to jump to conclusions and that need to paint the facts and narratives to back their argument.
Adding the reporter was a major error. The rest is mostly bluster. The biggest issue and by far the most important one is what becomes of this error and are corrective measures put in place and holding those accountable.
So many people, meaning politicians and those involved with the actions, have made matters worse and created far worse issues which continue to degrade our country.

 

[Moosefish]

@Moosefish - Here's your response to me:

I have no reason to think Tammy Duckworth is a complete idiot either given her career. I would think she had read the entire Chat given her background and presumable part of similar Chats. She could certainly be making a political statement but don't know her well. I can believe it. But to put things in perspective, this is just one person who is not directly involved in the incident so her comment isn't too relevant, but she does come from a different perspective.

I don't want to rehash everything (I appreciate your thoroughness in responding to various posts) but here's my bigger picture. I believe we agree there needs to be an investigation of a number of items related to this incident. Unfortunately, it gets "debated" in public without all the facts being known and the country is so much more divided that it's hard to find common ground.

Thank you for the comments. I do not think she is replying w/ all the facts. I do think (rightfully so) that she is responding by highlighting the fear of potential OPSEC being violated & the worst-case scenario. I respect her service. But, I think her comments are based on emotional reaction vs. reality.

That's really the big take-away: information has to be protected. That doesn't mean Signal was bad in this scenario, but it does highlight the fact that Goldberg being added COULD have been bad. He simply cashed in after the fact. I think that was a bit skeevish for not speaking up prior/during...but, at least he didn't hurt the op by speaking up prior. Kudos on that, I guess.

But, that's largely irrelevant here, beyond the screw-up of adding a reporter to the chat that shouldn't have been there.

There has been a semantics game with how to describe this (referring to the classified issue). Why can't the officials who are involved in this describe things as well as you have. I understand what you are saying but will wait for some official word (if it actually comes). It appears to me that there is some confusion between when the app can be used and which phones people were using. It doesn't seem smart to be part of this while you are in Russia, but maybe that's not a problem. These questions can be answered and hopefully we get something definite from the government. I think we all agree that a reporter should not have been part of the Chat and we really need to know the truth (assuming it doesn't comprise any security issues).

The problem is that although it is black/white, the subject matter "feels" clear (with enough fog to allow debate), but the details make it complicated. That's ok. Classified information is complicated. I'll explain why below.

As far as Russia, it seems that the US individual either didn't take his phone or didn't use it. It's another non-issue. That singular issue highlights the tempest in a teapot issue of this: Freaking out w/o actual data and/or perspective.

Regardless of anybody's feelings on Trump, et al: There is a repetitive theme of freakouts followed by corrections to the data, followed by absolute silence when final truth data is revealed.

But I still think you are biased (I certainly am) and that you are effective at finding the information that supports your desired end argument versus reaching a conclusion based on the facts. So, let's see if I am correct.

As I addressed above...everybody has bias. The difference here, for this subject...is that it's a black/white issue. There is no room for opinion. That's the literal key for classified information: It is. Or it isn't.

In this case, the information shared isn't classified.

Your argument seems to hinge on the assertion that the information shared by Hegseth was not classified. I disagree.

Ok, so I'm going to point out here, early: None of it was classified. You can disagree all you want. But, it's not a matter of opinion. You are simply wrong and everything you are reading to convince you otherwise is also wrong.

To repeat myself: Classification is not an opinion. Classification guides are literally the truth data. Although you provide references below...they are not the original classification authority (OCA). That matters.

My argument is supported by three documents.

1) My research suggests that the Department of Defense Manual 5200.01 is a cornerstone document for the DOD Information Security Program, governing how classified information is identified, handled, protected and declassified.

Vol. 1 of the above referenced manual states:
“Information shall be classified if its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security, including military plans, weapons systems, or operations.”

5200.01, you’re absolutely correct that it serves as a cornerstone for the DoD’s Information Security Program. The “reasonable expectation of damage” standard is real, but it’s not self-executing; it requires an official determination. You need a Classification Guide (which is the ACTUAL source) to declare specific information is actually classified.

In other words, it's non-specific guidance. You can try and shoe-horn the Signal information into it...but, the who, what, why, & where of what the DoD deals with every day is not that clear.....it's literally why Classification Guides exist.

You have to think of this as guidance for a "how-to", not as a classification guide. That's literally why classification guide exist...to classify information.

DoD Manual 5200.01, EO 13526, and the UCMJ provide a framework for protecting classified information, they don’t automatically render Hegseth’s disclosure a violation. 13526 doesn’t classify information retroactively or by default.

The main issue is the role of each of references you provided. Information isn’t classified simply because it’s sensitive or operationally relevant; it must be proactively designated as such by an OCA, through a Classification Guide.

Classification isn’t a blanket or automatic designation. it’s a deliberate process driven by an OCA. Classification Guides, which are detailed documents issued by OCAs, specify exactly what elements are classified and at what level (Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret).

This does not include the fact that he shared intelligence regarding a human target that was specific and apparently upset the ally that likely gathered it and shared it with us.

No. It was not "specific". Stop. Come on, man.

I think that leaves three possible rebuttals for you.

1. The document I referenced isn't relevant.
2. The information shared by Hegseth, if publicly disclosed prior to the operation, would not "reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security...”.
3. Point 2 isn't relevant, as nothing is classified until it is officially deemed as classified by a classification authority.

Perhaps there is another rebuttal I haven't identified. I'm open to your arguments.

4. Your understanding of the subject is wrong. Your take on how things are classified is flawed. None of the information was classified. The entire "issue" is actually a non-issue, outside of figuring how why Goldberg was added and how to avoid blatant OPSEC issues, in the future.

2) Executive Order 13526 Classified National Security Information

This EO identifies information that could "reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security", including military plans, weapons systems, or operations as classified.

So perhaps this EO isn't relevant, but if so, what has it been replaced by?

3) Uniform Code of Military Justice

• Article 92 addresses failure to obey an order, which includes mishandling classified information.
• Article 134 covers a range of offensives, including unauthorized disclosure of information that could harm national security, even if not technically labeled classified.

I'm trying to keep this tight, so I'll leave my argument there and give you a chance to reply.

As addressed above, your take on the definition of classified information is flawed.

Your use of the UCMJ here is totally irrelevant.

 

[Moosefish]

This is a worthless thread because neither side can check their emotion or try not to jump to conclusions and that need to paint the facts and narratives to back their argument.

FWIW, the actual regulations regarding classified data clears everyone involved in the Signal Chat. If anybody wants to discuss use of that encrypted messaging service moving forward, that's fine. But, this was only an OPSEC issue due to the reporter being added...which should be the ONLY issue we are discussing.

 

[Moosefish]

I'll open with a quote that hopefully sets the table for my response.


I acknowledge that your knowledge of this topic greatly exceeds mine. Huge revelation, I'm sure.

I also sincerely appreciate your posts and the research you put into them.

But I still think you are biased (I certainly am) and that you are effective at finding the information that supports your desired end argument versus reaching a conclusion based on the facts. So, let's see if I am correct.

Your argument seems to hinge on the assertion that the information shared by Hegseth was not classified. I disagree.

My argument is supported by three documents.

1) My research suggests that the Department of Defense Manual 5200.01 is a cornerstone document for the DOD Information Security Program, governing how classified information is identified, handled, protected and declassified.

Vol. 1 of the above referenced manual states:
“Information shall be classified if its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security, including military plans, weapons systems, or operations.”

Here is an excerpt of what Hegseth shared:

This does not include the fact that he shared intelligence regarding a human target that was specific and apparently upset the ally that likely gathered it and shared it with us.

I think that leaves three possible rebuttals for you.

1. The document I referenced isn't relevant.
2. The information shared by Hegseth, if publicly disclosed prior to the operation, would not "reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security...”.
3. Point 2 isn't relevant, as nothing is classified until it is officially deemed as classified by a classification authority.

Perhaps there is another rebuttal I haven't identified. I'm open to your arguments.

2) Executive Order 13526 Classified National Security Information

This EO identifies information that could "reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security", including military plans, weapons systems, or operations as classified.

So perhaps this EO isn't relevant, but if so, what has it been replaced by?

3) Uniform Code of Military Justice

• Article 92 addresses failure to obey an order, which includes mishandling classified information.
• Article 134 covers a range of offensives, including unauthorized disclosure of information that could harm national security, even if not technically labeled classified.

I'm trying to keep this tight, so I'll leave my argument there and give you a chance to reply.

Also, I will address the specifics of the actual information "shared" and how non-specific it was, if you want. But, that didn't fit into what I quoted above

 

[Moosefish]

I'll open with a quote that hopefully sets the table for my response.


I acknowledge that your knowledge of this topic greatly exceeds mine. Huge revelation, I'm sure.

I also sincerely appreciate your posts and the research you put into them.

But I still think you are biased (I certainly am) and that you are effective at finding the information that supports your desired end argument versus reaching a conclusion based on the facts. So, let's see if I am correct.

Your argument seems to hinge on the assertion that the information shared by Hegseth was not classified. I disagree.

My argument is supported by three documents.

1) My research suggests that the Department of Defense Manual 5200.01 is a cornerstone document for the DOD Information Security Program, governing how classified information is identified, handled, protected and declassified.

Vol. 1 of the above referenced manual states:
“Information shall be classified if its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security, including military plans, weapons systems, or operations.”

Here is an excerpt of what Hegseth shared:

This does not include the fact that he shared intelligence regarding a human target that was specific and apparently upset the ally that likely gathered it and shared it with us.

I think that leaves three possible rebuttals for you.

1. The document I referenced isn't relevant.
2. The information shared by Hegseth, if publicly disclosed prior to the operation, would not "reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security...”.
3. Point 2 isn't relevant, as nothing is classified until it is officially deemed as classified by a classification authority.

Perhaps there is another rebuttal I haven't identified. I'm open to your arguments.

2) Executive Order 13526 Classified National Security Information

This EO identifies information that could "reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security", including military plans, weapons systems, or operations as classified.

So perhaps this EO isn't relevant, but if so, what has it been replaced by?

3) Uniform Code of Military Justice

• Article 92 addresses failure to obey an order, which includes mishandling classified information.
• Article 134 covers a range of offensives, including unauthorized disclosure of information that could harm national security, even if not technically labeled classified.

I'm trying to keep this tight, so I'll leave my argument there and give you a chance to reply.

The other point that was hot in my mind, but I neglected to add: going strictly by the definitions you provided: literally everything related to even simple training missions would theoretically be "classified" without an OCA.

That's stupid and why OPSEC is a thing.

 

[blackpug6]

Tom cotton may have a point, but I don’t like it when people say “it is my understanding…“ Because that means they’re not willing to stick their neck out that it’s a fact.

As far as Scott Jennings, almost every single thing he said, was either wrong, or a lie.

The idea that this was “well thought out“ because it was literally a text thread is absurd. When he says that the White House admitted it, and owned their mistake, that’s just a complete lie. Donald Trump denied he was even aware of it, which is absurd; and then Pete Hegseth said that it was actually the reporter who is discredited, rather than himself. All nonsense. No accountability.

you speak so much
saying so little

you paste a win looking at replies?

 

[blackpug6]

Totally agree and I wasn’t suggesting there is a single appropriate reason for that group to be using Signal or anything similar.

In fact, my point was that the use is likely an intentional effort to avoid our laws regarding document retention.

The best way to avoid a future fight about release of internal communications is to not document internal communications.

nonsense.
stringing adjectives and a few vowels
You Look Less than what you were!

pug

 

[willdup]

Thank you for the comments. I do not think she is replying w/ all the facts. I do think (rightfully so) that she is responding by highlighting the fear of potential OPSEC being violated & the worst-case scenario. I respect her service. But, I think her comments are based on emotional reaction vs. reality.

That's really the big take-away: information has to be protected. That doesn't mean Signal was bad in this scenario, but it does highlight the fact that Goldberg being added COULD have been bad. He simply cashed in after the fact. I think that was a bit skeevish for not speaking up prior/during...but, at least he didn't hurt the op by speaking up prior. Kudos on that, I guess.

But, that's largely irrelevant here, beyond the screw-up of adding a reporter to the chat that shouldn't have been there.



The problem is that although it is black/white, the subject matter "feels" clear (with enough fog to allow debate), but the details make it complicated. That's ok. Classified information is complicated. I'll explain why below.

As far as Russia, it seems that the US individual either didn't take his phone or didn't use it. It's another non-issue. That singular issue highlights the tempest in a teapot issue of this: Freaking out w/o actual data and/or perspective.

Regardless of anybody's feelings on Trump, et al: There is a repetitive theme of freakouts followed by corrections to the data, followed by absolute silence when final truth data is revealed.



As I addressed above...everybody has bias. The difference here, for this subject...is that it's a black/white issue. There is no room for opinion. That's the literal key for classified information: It is. Or it isn't.

In this case, the information shared isn't classified.



Ok, so I'm going to point out here, early: None of it was classified. You can disagree all you want. But, it's not a matter of opinion. You are simply wrong and everything you are reading to convince you otherwise is also wrong.

To repeat myself: Classification is not an opinion. Classification guides are literally the truth data. Although you provide references below...they are not the original classification authority (OCA). That matters.


5200.01, you’re absolutely correct that it serves as a cornerstone for the DoD’s Information Security Program. The “reasonable expectation of damage” standard is real, but it’s not self-executing; it requires an official determination. You need a Classification Guide (which is the ACTUAL source) to declare specific information is actually classified.

In other words, it's non-specific guidance. You can try and shoe-horn the Signal information into it...but, the who, what, why, & where of what the DoD deals with every day is not that clear.....it's literally why Classification Guides exist.

You have to think of this as guidance for a "how-to", not as a classification guide. That's literally why classification guide exist...to classify information.

DoD Manual 5200.01, EO 13526, and the UCMJ provide a framework for protecting classified information, they don’t automatically render Hegseth’s disclosure a violation. 13526 doesn’t classify information retroactively or by default.

The main issue is the role of each of references you provided. Information isn’t classified simply because it’s sensitive or operationally relevant; it must be proactively designated as such by an OCA, through a Classification Guide.

Classification isn’t a blanket or automatic designation. it’s a deliberate process driven by an OCA. Classification Guides, which are detailed documents issued by OCAs, specify exactly what elements are classified and at what level (Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret).



No. It was not "specific". Stop. Come on, man.



4. Your understanding of the subject is wrong. Your take on how things are classified is flawed. None of the information was classified. The entire "issue" is actually a non-issue, outside of figuring how why Goldberg was added and how to avoid blatant OPSEC issues, in the future.



As addressed above, your take on the definition of classified information is flawed.

Your use of the UCMJ here is totally irrelevant.

So, I'll attempt to simplify your argument again. Please correct me if I am wrong.

The attack plans Hegseth shared were never processed via the procedure that renders something classified.

As such, it doesn't matter what Hegseth shared or how damaging the public disclosure of that information might have been.

What I'm not clear about is, do you think that the information, if publicly disclosed, could have "reasonably been expected to cause damage to national security"?

I'll let you reply before continuing as I don't want to argue against opinions you may or may not have.

 

[celticdawg]

Thank you for the comments. I do not think she is replying w/ all the facts. I do think (rightfully so) that she is responding by highlighting the fear of potential OPSEC being violated & the worst-case scenario. I respect her service. But, I think her comments are based on emotional reaction vs. reality.

That's really the big take-away: information has to be protected. That doesn't mean Signal was bad in this scenario, but it does highlight the fact that Goldberg being added COULD have been bad. He simply cashed in after the fact. I think that was a bit skeevish for not speaking up prior/during...but, at least he didn't hurt the op by speaking up prior. Kudos on that, I guess.

But, that's largely irrelevant here, beyond the screw-up of adding a reporter to the chat that shouldn't have been there.

It's nice to have an actual conversation. I don't have a problem with what you posted here. We don't know her actual motivation, but, as you said, basically irrelevant. How Goldberg got added is still an unanswered question as far as i have seen. Yes, he used it for his benefit, but I can't blame him for his actions. Yes, there was no direct harm, but questions remain. Will we find out who was actually responsible?

The problem is that although it is black/white, the subject matter "feels" clear (with enough fog to allow debate), but the details make it complicated. That's ok. Classified information is complicated. I'll explain why below.

As far as Russia, it seems that the US individual either didn't take his phone or didn't use it. It's another non-issue. That singular issue highlights the tempest in a teapot issue of this: Freaking out w/o actual data and/or perspective.

Regardless of anybody's feelings on Trump, et al: There is a repetitive theme of freakouts followed by corrections to the data, followed by absolute silence when final truth data is revealed.

I've read your explanation of classified information. I'm not qualified to comment. My problem is why didn't someone (the participants or the President) come out with a clear statement - that doesn't give me confidence. Trump first blamed the leak on an unnamed junior staffer (without providing evidence) so when they just start saying it's not classified it does not give me any confidence. Yes, Waltz now claims responsibility, but what happened.

I didn't see any follow up or clarification but if the personal phone wasn't used, fine. Yes, unfortunately people on "both sides" start attacking and offering opinions before we have data. Unfortunately, that's not going to change unless we get a real explanation when something happens, but that's unlikely. I haven't posted anything, but I would like an explanation of this story about Hegseth's wife supposedly being at meetings with foreign diplomats.

Freakouts followed by corrections to the data are happening on both sides - let's be fair (you're statement makes it sounds like it's just attacks against Trump. Trump supporters were so excited by DOGE's first list of the money they saved and it turned out to be a big overstatement. The $8B savings was actually $8M, but did Trump supporters acknowledge it later. No, some just tell us about Biden or say don't we want to stop all this fraud. So, I'll say one more time (not directed at you) there is probably a lot of fraud, but they could have gone after it in a better way. And some jumped all over the people 150 years old receiving benefits when Musk and Trump told them so. More silence.

A new story getting attention tonight. Claims are being made that 2.1 million illegal aliens received social security numbers last year (possible). But I doubt 1.3 million are already on Medicaid and obviously they shouldn't be allowed to vote. A social security number doesn't get you registered to vote. There is some question about what Musk is claiming, but the Trump supporters are wasting no time calling out anyone that won't agree with them. Don't know yet what the real answer is, but you will never see an apology from the attackers.

 

[TivoliDawg]

So, I'll attempt to simplify your argument again. Please correct me if I am wrong.

The attack plans Hegseth shared were never processed via the procedure that renders something classified.

As such, it doesn't matter what Hegseth shared or how damaging the public disclosure of that information might have been.

What I'm not clear about is, do you think that the information, if publicly disclosed, could have "reasonably been expected to cause damage to national security"?

I'll let you reply before continuing as I don't want to argue against opinions you may or may not have.

That was Gabbard’s hilarious testimony.

She claims that it could not have been classified because it did not go through the classification process. Lolololol

Like what?

In case there was any doubt she is an idiot and totally unqualified, that confirmed it.

That was followed up by someone educating her about what would be/ should be considered classified. And then she went with the “I do not recall” Richard Nixon lines. WTF.

 

[atlanta cock#]

That was Gabbard’s hilarious testimony.

She claims that it could not have been classified because it did not go through the classification process. Lolololol

Like what?

In case there was any doubt she is an idiot and totally unqualified, that confirmed it.

That was followed up by someone educating her about what would be/ should be considered classified. And then she went with the “I do not recall” Richard Nixon lines. WTF.

Hegseth decides. Not you. Not me. Not Trump. Not General Mills.

 

[magnolia93ugagrad]

And so it continues

 

[Moosefish]

So, I'll attempt to simplify your argument again. Please correct me if I am wrong.

The attack plans Hegseth shared were never processed via the procedure that renders something classified.

Part of me is frustrated because if feels like I'm talking in circles and re-addressing things I've already explained. The other part of me realizes that dealing with classified information is not something most here (or anywhere, really) are familiar with. I tried to be simple, you brought details, I met halfway and tried to address complicated issues in a simple way. You've now asked for another novel 🤣

To address your question: No, that is not what I am saying. I know you are trying to bring Gabbard's comments into this. She is also technically correct. But, I also don't think she needed to argue that...but, she was also testifying before Congress. I don't think that's an irrelevant point, especially before the full text of the leak had been shared.

I'm going to stick to the black/white argument I'm making (because it's both technically correct and the easiest to understand), which demonstrates (again) why there was no classified in the Signal Chat.

First, I'm going to be technically correct (the best kind of correct 😜) :

The DoD operates under a framework where vast amounts of information are generated daily, ranging from mundane administrative details to sensitive operational plans. To manage this, classification guides are established to provide standardized criteria for determining what information requires protection. They outline categories of information (e.g., military plans, intelligence sources, or operational details) that are presumed to warrant classification based on the potential damage their unauthorized disclosure could cause to national security.

The DoD churns out information nonstop, from trivial logistics to critical ops, and classification guides are the backbone for sorting what’s protected. They flag categories like military plans or intelligence as classified if their leak could harm national security, designed to handle volume without bogging down operations.

However, consider:

1. Hegseth as SecDef is the OCA (original classification authority) for all information generated by the DoD. In the Signal Chat, Hegseth exercised this authority by deeming the shared details unclassified, a decision within his legal purview unless overridden by the President. Hegseth’s OCA role trumps guideline assumptions.

2. The thresholds for what is/isn't classified can shift from (not talking politics here) very conservative to very liberal interpretations. Classification thresholds are flexible, hinging on context and the OCA’s judgment, as Executive Order 13526 defines harm levels from "damage" to "exceptionally grave damage." Hegseth correctly viewed the information as unclassified because it omitted critical specifics.

3. If you use a very strict interpretation, literally every bit of information would be classified. The DoD would be hamstrung by our own rules and could literally not communicate in an effective manner. A strict interpretation, classifying every DoD detail from schedules to strike plans, would paralyze operations.

Specifically on #3 and to another point you made about why everyone included was involved. Rubio nailed it (and backs up my multiple comments on the issue:

“This thing [the chat] was set up for purposes of coordinating how everyone was going to call. When these things happen, I need to call foreign ministers, especially of our close allies. We need to notify members of Congress. Other members of the team have different people they need to notify as well. And that was the purpose of why it was set up."

As such, it doesn't matter what Hegseth shared or how damaging the public disclosure of that information might have been.

No, of course it could have been damaging...again, that's why it was OPSEC. You are hanging your argument on the use of the word "damaging". That is an incredibly wide and all-inclusive descriptor. That's effectively a justification, not a guide. How can anybody consistently apply that standard to every bit of information produced by the DoD? Judgement by an OCA is what matters.

What I'm not clear about is, do you think that the information, if publicly disclosed, could have "reasonably been expected to cause damage to national security"?

69.3

If that number was publicly disclosed, it could reasonably expect to cause damage to national security.

What does that number reference? Can't tell you. But, it's reasonable to expect to cause damage to national security.

But, what's it in reference to? Can't tell you. You need more details to know what it's so potentially damaging.

OPSEC covers things like the random number I provided above. But, that doesn't mean it's automatically classified...because it lacks context. Using the definition you provided above for justification of classification of any bit of information is a really poor guide.

I'll restate my point, in a more applicable manner: Those definitions are really hard to understand/apply without context and experience in this realm. It is a waste of time to debate here the degree to which any of the information at play here applies to those definitions.

I'll let you reply before continuing as I don't want to argue against opinions you may or may not have.

Now, beyond being technically correct above, I'll provide the logical argument for why the information wasn't classified:

The information that Hegseth provided gave "no names, no targets, no locations, no units, no routes, no sources, no methods, and no classified information."

The chat did specify aircraft types and a precise timeline, it omitted granular details like exact targets, coordinates, or operational sources.

The information was vague enough to avoid revealing critical intelligence (like specific Houthi commanders’ locations or US military methods), so it did not meet the threshold for classification, which hinges on the potential harm of disclosure.

Classification often depends on whether information could aid an adversary. If the details were shared after coordination with regional partners (which is apparently what happened) or were too late to be actionable by the Houthis, they didn’t warrant classification at that moment. For instance, broad updates about weather conditions or a general "go" signal might be sensitive but not inherently classified without further context.

The debate hinges on this gap: what’s sensitive versus what’s officially classified.

Key point alert: the tweet you shared way above that used the 2012 CENTCOM classification guide referenced Deliberative Planning. Let's assume that still held sway (it doesn't):

That's a huge difference that I'm not going to spend 3400 more words explaining. Long story, short: A plan, sitting on the shelf will be much more inherently classified than real-time ops. I realize that seems counter-intuitive. But, there are a lengthy lists of reasons for this. I am not going get into that for professional reasons.

Beyond that, the actual information that was shared lacked critical specifics.

5200.01 provides the framework for determining what qualifies as classified information and states that information may be classified if its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable damage to national security, and it must fall into one of eight categories, such as military plans, weapons systems, or intelligence activities. For military operations specifically, the manual emphasizes that classification often depends on the level of detail: broad intentions or general capabilities might not meet the threshold, while specific targets, timelines, or methods typically do.

In the Signal chat, Hegseth shared details that contained "no names, no targets, no locations, no units, no routes, no sources, no methods, and no classified information."

You are arguing that this seems contradictory because aircraft types and a bombing schedule sound specific. However, the DoD manual helps clarify why this might not cross the classification line if key details were absent.

Per the manual, operational plans often become classified when they include "critical elements" that could compromise a mission if revealed, like exact geographic coordinates, unit designations (e.g., "3rd Battalion, 1st Marines"), or intelligence sources pinpointing enemy positions.

For example, a classified strike plan might detail: "F-18s from Carrier Air Wing 9, launching from USS Abraham Lincoln at 0300Z, will strike Houthi radar at 15.3528°N, 43.2877°E, based on SIGINT from Source X."

Compare that to the Signal chat’s content: "F-18s and MQ-9s will drop bombs at a specific time." The latter omits locations, units, routes, and sources. Elements that, per DoD 5200.01, elevate information from sensitive to classified by making it actionable for an adversary.

This is the distinction. The manual’s guidance suggests that general knowledge of US capabilities (like the use of F-18s which is widely known to operate from carriers) or MQ-9 drones (ubiquitous in Middle East operations) doesn’t inherently warrant classification unless paired with specifics that reveal intent or vulnerabilities.

Public DoD press releases often disclose aircraft types post-strike without classifying them, e.g. a January 2024 statement on Houthi strikes mentioned "US Navy F/A-18s" without triggering a security breach. The Signal chat’s timeline ("first bombs drop at X time") is trickier, because it’s precise but lacks context like "where" or "against whom."

Without that, it’s a fragment, not a plan an enemy could counter.

The manual also notes that classification requires an OCA to assess damage potential. If Hegseth, as an OCA, judged that the chat’s details (stripped of targets or methods) wouldn’t enable the Houthis to reposition forces or thwart the strike, he could defensibly call it unclassified.

You might argue that any pre-strike timeline risks tipping off adversaries, but the DoD standard isn’t about ANY risk, it’s about identifiable damage. If the Houthis already anticipated strikes (as Yemen conflict patterns suggest), the chat’s info would not shift the battlefield.

So, lacking names, targets, locations, or methods aligns with DoD 5200.01’s criteria for what stays unclassified. The chat offered a snapshot, not a blueprint and skirts the classification threshold....which is perfectly "fine" when you're knowingly dealing with OPSEC.

Which again, bring us back to the real issue: Goldberg was a part of the conversation. THAT was the issue, not the information provided.

 

[Moosefish]

And so it continues

View embedded media

FWIW, that's already been debunked, as it was dealing with legacy contacts from a Google Calendar and everything was apparently cc'd to his .gov account.

 

[Lava-Man]

 

[willdup]

Part of me is frustrated because if feels like I'm talking in circles and re-addressing things I've already explained. The other part of me realizes that dealing with classified information is not something most here (or anywhere, really) are familiar with. I tried to be simple, you brought details, I met halfway and tried to address complicated issues in a simple way. You've now asked for another novel 🤣

To address your question: No, that is not what I am saying. I know you are trying to bring Gabbard's comments into this. She is also technically correct. But, I also don't think she needed to argue that...but, she was also testifying before Congress. I don't think that's an irrelevant point, especially before the full text of the leak had been shared.

I'm going to stick to the black/white argument I'm making (because it's both technically correct and the easiest to understand), which demonstrates (again) why there was no classified in the Signal Chat.

First, I'm going to be technically correct (the best kind of correct 😜) :

The DoD operates under a framework where vast amounts of information are generated daily, ranging from mundane administrative details to sensitive operational plans. To manage this, classification guides are established to provide standardized criteria for determining what information requires protection. They outline categories of information (e.g., military plans, intelligence sources, or operational details) that are presumed to warrant classification based on the potential damage their unauthorized disclosure could cause to national security.

The DoD churns out information nonstop, from trivial logistics to critical ops, and classification guides are the backbone for sorting what’s protected. They flag categories like military plans or intelligence as classified if their leak could harm national security, designed to handle volume without bogging down operations.

However, consider:

1. Hegseth as SecDef is the OCA (original classification authority) for all information generated by the DoD. In the Signal Chat, Hegseth exercised this authority by deeming the shared details unclassified, a decision within his legal purview unless overridden by the President. Hegseth’s OCA role trumps guideline assumptions.

2. The thresholds for what is/isn't classified can shift from (not talking politics here) very conservative to very liberal interpretations. Classification thresholds are flexible, hinging on context and the OCA’s judgment, as Executive Order 13526 defines harm levels from "damage" to "exceptionally grave damage." Hegseth correctly viewed the information as unclassified because it omitted critical specifics.

3. If you use a very strict interpretation, literally every bit of information would be classified. The DoD would be hamstrung by our own rules and could literally not communicate in an effective manner. A strict interpretation, classifying every DoD detail from schedules to strike plans, would paralyze operations.

Specifically on #3 and to another point you made about why everyone included was involved. Rubio nailed it (and backs up my multiple comments on the issue:

“This thing [the chat] was set up for purposes of coordinating how everyone was going to call. When these things happen, I need to call foreign ministers, especially of our close allies. We need to notify members of Congress. Other members of the team have different people they need to notify as well. And that was the purpose of why it was set up."



No, of course it could have been damaging...again, that's why it was OPSEC. You are hanging your argument on the use of the word "damaging". That is an incredibly wide and all-inclusive descriptor. That's effectively a justification, not a guide. How can anybody consistently apply that standard to every bit of information produced by the DoD? Judgement by an OCA is what matters.



69.3

If that number was publicly disclosed, it could reasonably expect to cause damage to national security.

What does that number reference? Can't tell you. But, it's reasonable to expect to cause damage to national security.

But, what's it in reference to? Can't tell you. You need more details to know what it's so potentially damaging.

OPSEC covers things like the random number I provided above. But, that doesn't mean it's automatically classified...because it lacks context. Using the definition you provided above for justification of classification of any bit of information is a really poor guide.

I'll restate my point, in a more applicable manner: Those definitions are really hard to understand/apply without context and experience in this realm. It is a waste of time to debate here the degree to which any of the information at play here applies to those definitions.



Now, beyond being technically correct above, I'll provide the logical argument for why the information wasn't classified:

The information that Hegseth provided gave "no names, no targets, no locations, no units, no routes, no sources, no methods, and no classified information."

The chat did specify aircraft types and a precise timeline, it omitted granular details like exact targets, coordinates, or operational sources.

The information was vague enough to avoid revealing critical intelligence (like specific Houthi commanders’ locations or US military methods), so it did not meet the threshold for classification, which hinges on the potential harm of disclosure.

Classification often depends on whether information could aid an adversary. If the details were shared after coordination with regional partners (which is apparently what happened) or were too late to be actionable by the Houthis, they didn’t warrant classification at that moment. For instance, broad updates about weather conditions or a general "go" signal might be sensitive but not inherently classified without further context.

The debate hinges on this gap: what’s sensitive versus what’s officially classified.

Key point alert: the tweet you shared way above that used the 2012 CENTCOM classification guide referenced Deliberative Planning. Let's assume that still held sway (it doesn't):

That's a huge difference that I'm not going to spend 3400 more words explaining. Long story, short: A plan, sitting on the shelf will be much more inherently classified than real-time ops. I realize that seems counter-intuitive. But, there are a lengthy lists of reasons for this. I am not going get into that for professional reasons.

Beyond that, the actual information that was shared lacked critical specifics.

5200.01 provides the framework for determining what qualifies as classified information and states that information may be classified if its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable damage to national security, and it must fall into one of eight categories, such as military plans, weapons systems, or intelligence activities. For military operations specifically, the manual emphasizes that classification often depends on the level of detail: broad intentions or general capabilities might not meet the threshold, while specific targets, timelines, or methods typically do.

In the Signal chat, Hegseth shared details that contained "no names, no targets, no locations, no units, no routes, no sources, no methods, and no classified information."

You are arguing that this seems contradictory because aircraft types and a bombing schedule sound specific. However, the DoD manual helps clarify why this might not cross the classification line if key details were absent.

Per the manual, operational plans often become classified when they include "critical elements" that could compromise a mission if revealed, like exact geographic coordinates, unit designations (e.g., "3rd Battalion, 1st Marines"), or intelligence sources pinpointing enemy positions.

For example, a classified strike plan might detail: "F-18s from Carrier Air Wing 9, launching from USS Abraham Lincoln at 0300Z, will strike Houthi radar at 15.3528°N, 43.2877°E, based on SIGINT from Source X."

Compare that to the Signal chat’s content: "F-18s and MQ-9s will drop bombs at a specific time." The latter omits locations, units, routes, and sources. Elements that, per DoD 5200.01, elevate information from sensitive to classified by making it actionable for an adversary.

This is the distinction. The manual’s guidance suggests that general knowledge of US capabilities (like the use of F-18s which is widely known to operate from carriers) or MQ-9 drones (ubiquitous in Middle East operations) doesn’t inherently warrant classification unless paired with specifics that reveal intent or vulnerabilities.

Public DoD press releases often disclose aircraft types post-strike without classifying them, e.g. a January 2024 statement on Houthi strikes mentioned "US Navy F/A-18s" without triggering a security breach. The Signal chat’s timeline ("first bombs drop at X time") is trickier, because it’s precise but lacks context like "where" or "against whom."

Without that, it’s a fragment, not a plan an enemy could counter.

The manual also notes that classification requires an OCA to assess damage potential. If Hegseth, as an OCA, judged that the chat’s details (stripped of targets or methods) wouldn’t enable the Houthis to reposition forces or thwart the strike, he could defensibly call it unclassified.

You might argue that any pre-strike timeline risks tipping off adversaries, but the DoD standard isn’t about ANY risk, it’s about identifiable damage. If the Houthis already anticipated strikes (as Yemen conflict patterns suggest), the chat’s info would not shift the battlefield.

So, lacking names, targets, locations, or methods aligns with DoD 5200.01’s criteria for what stays unclassified. The chat offered a snapshot, not a blueprint and skirts the classification threshold....which is perfectly "fine" when you're knowingly dealing with OPSEC.

Which again, bring us back to the real issue: Goldberg was a part of the conversation. THAT was the issue, not the information provided.

Moose, I'm trying to simplify, and you give me another 2000-word dissertation...

Ill take one more run at a response. Feel free to ignore if you feel you have nothing more to add to the discussion.

1. The Secretary's Authority Isn’t Unlimited
Sure, the Secretary has Original Classification Authority (OCA), but that doesn’t mean they can just decide sensitive operational info isn’t classified on a whim. There are rules—Executive Order 13526 and DoD regulations—that set clear boundaries. It’s not like they can ignore the criteria for what counts as classified information.

2. "No Names, No Targets, No Locations" Doesn’t Cut It
Saying “no names, no targets, no locations” doesn’t make the info harmless. If you tell people something like “F-18s and MQ-9s are dropping bombs at this time,” you’re still giving away critical details that adversaries can use. Even without exact coordinates, the combination of timing, aircraft types, and mission status is classified because it’s actionable intelligence.

3. OPSEC and Classification Go Hand-in-Hand
The idea that operational security (OPSEC) is separate from classification is just wrong. These systems work together. If something needs OPSEC protection—like imminent strike details—it probably meets the criteria for classification too.

4. Misunderstanding the "Damage" Standard
Here’s the thing: classified info is defined as stuff that could reasonably harm national security if leaked—not that it will cause harm or that you have to prove it beyond a doubt. Advance knowledge of strike timing and aircraft types fits this definition perfectly because it helps adversaries prepare defenses or counterattacks.

5. Inconsistent Secrecy Standards Are a Problem
This point is important. This administration has been all over the place with secrecy rules. For example, they’ve used “state secrets” privilege to block basic flight info about deportation flights to El Salvador but claim imminent combat mission details don’t need classification? That’s inconsistent—and honestly, it undermines their argument. If deportation flight schedules are super sensitive, how are military strike plans not?

6. The Real Issue Is Operational Security
The argument about whether Goldberg should’ve been included in the conversation misses the bigger problem: sensitive strike details were shared in a way that compromised operational security. If the info wasn’t classified, Goldberg’s inclusion wouldn’t matter—but since it involved imminent military action, it absolutely does matter.

Thats all I've got. You can explain to me again how I am wrong or pass entirly. I'm good either way.

 

[TivoliDawg]

Moose, I'm trying to simplify, and you give me another 2000-word dissertation...

Ill take one more run at a response. Feel free to ignore if you feel you have nothing more to add to the discussion.

1. The Secretary's Authority Isn’t Unlimited
Sure, the Secretary has Original Classification Authority (OCA), but that doesn’t mean they can just decide sensitive operational info isn’t classified on a whim. There are rules—Executive Order 13526 and DoD regulations—that set clear boundaries. It’s not like they can ignore the criteria for what counts as classified information.

2. "No Names, No Targets, No Locations" Doesn’t Cut It
Saying “no names, no targets, no locations” doesn’t make the info harmless. If you tell people something like “F-18s and MQ-9s are dropping bombs at this time,” you’re still giving away critical details that adversaries can use. Even without exact coordinates, the combination of timing, aircraft types, and mission status is classified because it’s actionable intelligence.

3. OPSEC and Classification Go Hand-in-Hand
The idea that operational security (OPSEC) is separate from classification is just wrong. These systems work together. If something needs OPSEC protection—like imminent strike details—it probably meets the criteria for classification too.

4. Misunderstanding the "Damage" Standard
Here’s the thing: classified info is defined as stuff that could reasonably harm national security if leaked—not that it will cause harm or that you have to prove it beyond a doubt. Advance knowledge of strike timing and aircraft types fits this definition perfectly because it helps adversaries prepare defenses or counterattacks.

5. Inconsistent Secrecy Standards Are a Problem
This point is important. This administration has been all over the place with secrecy rules. For example, they’ve used “state secrets” privilege to block basic flight info about deportation flights to El Salvador but claim imminent combat mission details don’t need classification? That’s inconsistent—and honestly, it undermines their argument. If deportation flight schedules are super sensitive, how are military strike plans not?

6. The Real Issue Is Operational Security
The argument about whether Goldberg should’ve been included in the conversation misses the bigger problem: sensitive strike details were shared in a way that compromised operational security. If the info wasn’t classified, Goldberg’s inclusion wouldn’t matter—but since it involved imminent military action, it absolutely does matter.

Thats all I've got. You can explain to me again how I am wrong or pass entirly. I'm good either way.

Don’t waste your breath.

These were absolutely war plans, they were shared in a channel in which they should not have been, the chat included people both inside and outside the admin. who were not on a need-to-know basis, and I assume this was on done on personal cell. phones because you would def hear about it if these were work phones that were secure.

If Trump wasn’t destroying our economy by the hour, this would still be the biggest story.

Thr WSJ reported on some low level employee who accidentally emailed a journalist some benign, harmless document and that person was formally reprimanded and also placed on leave.

Looks like Waltz and Hegseth get an easier std. than entry level clerks at the pentagon.