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Georgia election security

Dawg 'n IT

War Daddy
Gold Member
Jan 31, 2002
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I couldn't imagine being told devices throughout my organization have several vulnerabilities requiring software updates then not just delay the updates by a couple of weeks, but 18+ months. This after the next use of the devices which is still a year out.

How it started...


How it's going...

 
Raffensperger and Kemp seem uniquely dedicated to preserving a system with no audit trail. Most states that use electronic BMD's only use them for special cases, such as voters with disabilities. In most cases those produce a user readable ballot.

Georgia is rather unique in the US in using them for general in person voting, particularly with no user-verifiable output. The QR code is proprietary (although easily hacked according to Halderman) and unreadable by the voter. That was the main problem that got their last system (before Dominion) ruled invalid in court after 9 years of litigation.
 
This expert--Halderman--was given access to the voting machines, along with passwords, and did his research project over a period of 12 weeks.

I guess if you gave somebody the keys to your car, and give them 12 weeks, they could probably find a way to steal your car.
 
I've looked.

So has the Fulton County grand jury, the Republican-led Georgia Secretary of State's office, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, and the Trump-appointed US Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia.

There's nothing to see.
 
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Raffensperger and Kemp seem uniquely dedicated to preserving a system with no audit trail. Most states that use electronic BMD's only use them for special cases, such as voters with disabilities. In most cases those produce a user readable ballot.

Georgia is rather unique in the US in using them for general in person voting, particularly with no user-verifiable output. The QR code is proprietary (although easily hacked according to Halderman) and unreadable by the voter. That was the main problem that got their last system (before Dominion) ruled invalid in court after 9 years of litigation.
I’m not following your sentence no user verifiable output as my ballot prints out and I walk over to vote scanner which runs it thru to count. So there is a hard copy to go back and audit / review if needed. Am I interpreting your analysis incorrectly?
 
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I've looked.

So has the Fulton County grand jury, the Republican-led Georgia Secretary of State's office, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, and the Trump-appointed US Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia.

There's nothing to see.
Trump also hired two separate firms to investigate voter fraud. At a cost of well over a million dollars both came to the conclusion the voter fraud claims were all false.

But I'm sure even though Trump hired these firms some will still say they were just biased against him.
 
I’m not following your sentence no user verifiable output as my ballot prints out and I walk over to vote scanner which runs it thru to count. So there is a hard copy to go back and audit / review if needed. Am I interpreting your analysis incorrectly?
When you insert your paper printout into the scanner, what exactly does the scanner read to count your vote?
 
I’m not following your sentence no user verifiable output as my ballot prints out and I walk over to vote scanner which runs it thru to count. So there is a hard copy to go back and audit / review if needed. Am I interpreting your analysis incorrectly?
I may have worded poorly. Some of my sentences get too complicated. The problem with the Electronic Ballot Marking Device, as configured in Georgia, is that it prints 2 things. First thing is a custom QR code that the scanner reads, but you can't, even if you try to use the QR/Barcode Scanner on your phone. That's your legal ballot.

The second is a summary of your choices in text. The scanner ignores this. Theoretically, the summary should reflect what is in the QR code, but there is no way for you to confirm that.

Other states and counties have different configurations of the same software. For example, Arizona only uses electronic BMD's for special needs voters. All other in person voters complete a hand-marked ballot, where you can see all the choices you made, then you put through the scanner.
 
I may have worded poorly. Some of my sentences get too complicated. The problem with the Electronic Ballot Marking Device, as configured in Georgia, is that it prints 2 things. First thing is a custom QR code that the scanner reads, but you can't, even if you try to use the QR/Barcode Scanner on your phone. That's your legal ballot.

The second is a summary of your choices in text. The scanner ignores this. Theoretically, the summary should reflect what is in the QR code, but there is no way for you to confirm that.

Other states and counties have different configurations of the same software. For example, Arizona only uses electronic BMD's for special needs voters. All other in person voters complete a hand-marked ballot, where you can see all the choices you made, then you put through the scanner.
Maybe they need to update the process but if there was fraud or something going on with qr codes it would show up in the hand recount which eliminates the machine that uses the code. The totals would be different.

Every hand recount has matched the machine count. There is no way possible thousands of volunteer poll workers could collaborate across the state and magically come up with the same numbers as the machine to committ fraud.
 
Maybe they need to update the process but if there was fraud or something going on with qr codes it would show up in the hand recount which eliminates the machine that uses the code. The totals would be different.

Every hand recount has matched the machine count. There is no way possible thousands of volunteer poll workers could collaborate across the state and magically come up with the same numbers as the machine to committ fraud.
We were talking about the findings from the Halderman Report which has been sealed since the report was entered into evidence (expert testimony) in the ongoing Curling V. Raffensperger case in Georgia.

The recounts are a separate topic with numerous issues. Some findings are still being contested in the courts.

By refusing to update their election software, a common practice in precertification of equipment, the state will be out of compliance with manufacturer and federal EAC requirements. That leaves the state open to the valid challenge that the equipment is not able to pass normal standards for logic and accuracy testing in the 2024 election.
 
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