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Well, I laughed - A shouting match, GATA DJT….

Well, time has already told...Trump has a long list of non-supportive Russia actions....which is why your post was largely inaccurate.

I'll add (as I've said before): Being on non-combative terms with Russia is an objectively good thing. Their nuclear capability is still significant, even as their conventional capabilities wane.

We don't want them to keep getting comfortable w/ China. That is really, really bad.

So, even as bad (really, really bad) as Putin is...anything we can do to affect the Russia/China relationship is a good thing. If that means we can keep peace, increase economic opportunities...that's good for everybody.

What if we make deals w/ Russia that are subjectively better than whatever they're getting from China? What if we are not making Russia feel so threatened, they feel forced to side with China? What if we can make Putin feel secure enough, that he doesn't feel the need to expand borders?

What if, what if, what if????? Peace? Prosperity? China kept in a corner?

The world isn't perfect. Sometimes, you have to maneuver your adversaries into a corner of your choosing. The US has tremendous economic power that we can use.

/rant
You obviously consider Trump is an honorable man who has honorable intentions concerning Putin and Putin's invasion of Ukraine. I just can't share in that if for no other reason than Trump has already called Zelensky a dictator. who started the war with Russia. That alone is enough to make any rational person distrust Trump in a major way. Further, I just can't accept that being on noncombative terms with Russia is a good thing. Trump is fast alienating our western allies in favor of being friends with Russia. I agree with you in keeping Russia and China on neutral terms is an objective worth pursuing. But alienating our western allies and making friends with Putin to do so are not acceptable.
 
There is a very long history of avoiding crossing the ultimate line by engaging in the sort of proxy actions that we have been conducting in Ukraine. This isn’t radical at all. I suspect I don’t have to break this down for you.
Well, outside of the "proxy" point, I'm pretty sure you just made my exact point, for me. You brought up "MAD" in a non-MAD situation.

You're right, you don't have to break this down for me. Your points are largely wrong.
 
Well, outside of the ill-informed "proxy" point (lord help us), I'm pretty sure you just made my exact point, for me. You brought up "MAD" in a non-MAD situation.

You're right, you don't have to break this down for me. Your points are largely wrong.
At least you’re confident
 
Wow, that is the limits of your understanding of global military engagement? Fascinating
Is there some kind of global military engagement that Putin adheres to ? All I know is that I’m not willing to gamble on escalation in this situation. Luckily for all of us Trump isn’t either. You made the tough guy argument that we have nukes too.
 
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Well, outside of the "proxy" point, I'm pretty sure you just made my exact point, for me. You brought up "MAD" in a non-MAD situation.

You're right, you don't have to break this down for me. Your points are largely wrong.
MAD doesn’t stop all military conflict between nuclear powers it just changes how those conflicts happen. Since full-scale war risks nuclear escalation, nuclear states avoid direct fights and instead engage in proxy wars, limited conflicts, and hybrid warfare (cyberattacks, economic pressure, disinformation, etc.).

Look at the Cold War. MAD prevented the U.S. and USSR from fighting directly, but they still backed opposing sides in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Korea. Likewise, Russia and NATO avoid direct clashes in Ukraine, but both are deeply involved in supporting different sides. Another example, closer to my academic study- India and Pakistan (both nuclear-armed) fought a limited war in Kargil in 1999 without escalating to nuclear use.
 
MAD doesn’t stop all military conflict between nuclear powers it just changes how those conflicts happen. Since full-scale war risks nuclear escalation, nuclear states avoid direct fights and instead engage in proxy wars, limited conflicts, and hybrid warfare (cyberattacks, economic pressure, disinformation, etc.).

Look at the Cold War. MAD prevented the U.S. and USSR from fighting directly, but they still backed opposing sides in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Korea. Likewise, Russia and NATO avoid direct clashes in Ukraine, but both are deeply involved in supporting different sides. Another example, closer to my academic study- India and Pakistan (both nuclear-armed) fought a limited war in Kargil in 1999 without escalating to nuclear use.
That book learning’ll get you in trouble
 
MAD doesn’t stop all military conflict between nuclear powers it just changes how those conflicts happen. Since full-scale war risks nuclear escalation, nuclear states avoid direct fights and instead engage in proxy wars, limited conflicts, and hybrid warfare (cyberattacks, economic pressure, disinformation, etc.).

Look at the Cold War. MAD prevented the U.S. and USSR from fighting directly, but they still backed opposing sides in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Korea. Likewise, Russia and NATO avoid direct clashes in Ukraine, but both are deeply involved in supporting different sides. Another example, closer to my academic study- India and Pakistan (both nuclear-armed) fought a limited war in Kargil in 1999 without escalating to nuclear use.

This is a dated high-school level of understanding of Nuclear Deterrence Strategy. I'm not trying to sound arrogant here...but, this is literally what I do, on a daily basis. I've been in this business for almost 21 years.

You are not going to explain anything to me that I'm not intimately aware of at a professional level. Your 'proxy' examples are not functionally relevant for any discussion of modern day nuclear deterrence. The Russia/Ukraine/NATO discussion is barely a nuclear discussion. It touches a dozen other subjects, first.

I can provide a long list of reading material, if you're interested in the subject. I'd love to have a list of your India/Pakistan reading material (honest...not being sarcastic). The Kargil War was a fascinating study...but, not one I'd apply to an applicable study of relevant nuclear deterrence, as far as the US is concerned. Was it intense? Yes. Did it apply extra pressure? Obviously. But, it was a regional nuclear power conflict that largely is not applicable to the US, or how we interact with global Nuclear powers.

If anything, it highlights the issues with the Russia/Ukraine War. Kargil was a textbook example of the stability-instability paradox, where nuclear deterrence prevents large-scale war but emboldens lower-level aggression.

Pakistan’s gamble in Kargil rested on the belief that India would not risk nuclear escalation over a limited incursion. The lesson here is that nuclear weapons can stabilize major conflicts but destabilize smaller ones, as states may exploit the perceived safety net for sub-conventional actions like insurgencies or proxy wars....which is a great example of why Ukraine's only hope of bringing in US/NATO to engage in military action for inevitable escalation is a literal recipe for disaster.

Both India & Pakistan avoided overt nuclear threats, which helped prevent panic or miscalculation. However, the reported movement of Pakistani missiles highlights the risk of ambiguous signaling...showing that nuclear posturing must be carefully calibrated and that ambiguity or aggression can erode deterrence and invite misjudgment.

BIG Lesson here: The U.S. intervention w/ Kargil underscored the importance of external actors in preventing nuclear crises between regional powers.

For deterrence to hold, the international community must reinforce norms against escalation and provide offramps for de-escalation, especially when direct communication between adversaries is limited.

Does this sound familiar? Maybe what Trump is trying to do?

Pakistan’s hope that its nuclear capability would paralyze India’s response did not succeed. India’s willingness to fight showed that nuclear deterrence does not guarantee immunity from retaliation in limited wars. The lesson is that nuclear weapons deter total war but not necessarily all forms of conflict, requiring states to anticipate and prepare for conventional contingencies.

For Pakistan, the military’s dominance over decision-making complicated deterrence dynamics and Nawaz Sharif bowing to US pressure reflected internal disarray, which suggested that deterrence is only as effective as the coherence of the state wielding it. I think there are direct parallels to Ukraine, here.

The Kargil War flirted with a nuclear exchange, but it ultimately stayed conventional due to a mix of restraint, deterrence, and diplomacy....exactly what we are trying to do in ending the war in Ukraine.
 
This is a dated high-school level of understanding of Nuclear Deterrence Strategy. I'm not trying to sound arrogant here...but, this is what I do, on a daily basis. I've been in this business for almost 21 years.

You are not going to explain anything to me that I'm not intimately aware of at a professional level. Your 'proxy' examples are not functionally relevant for any discussion of modern day nuclear deterrence. The Russia/Ukraine/NATO discussion is barely a nuclear discussion. It touches a dozen other subjects, first.

I can provide a long list of reading material, if you're interested in the subject. I'd love to have a list of your India/Pakistan reading material (honest...not being sarcastic). The Kargil War was a fascinating study...but, not one I'd apply to an applicable study of relevant nuclear deterrence, as far as the US is concerned. Was it intense? Yes. Did it apply extra pressure? Obviously. But, it was a regional nuclear power conflict that largely is not applicable to the US, or how we interact with global Nuclear powers.

If anything, it highlights the issues with the Russia/Ukraine War. Kargil was a textbook example of the stability-instability paradox, where nuclear deterrence prevents large-scale war but emboldens lower-level aggression.

Pakistan’s gamble in Kargil rested on the belief that India would not risk nuclear escalation over a limited incursion. The lesson here is that nuclear weapons can stabilize major conflicts but destabilize smaller ones, as states may exploit the perceived safety net for sub-conventional actions like insurgencies or proxy wars....which is a great example of why Ukraine's only hope of bringing in US/NATO to engage in military action for inevitable escalation is a literal recipe for disaster.

Both India & Pakistan avoided overt nuclear threats, which helped prevent panic or miscalculation. However, the reported movement of Pakistani missiles highlights the risk of ambiguous signaling...showing that nuclear posturing must be carefully calibrated and that ambiguity or aggression can erode deterrence and invite misjudgment.

BIG Lesson here: The U.S. intervention w/ Kargil underscored the importance of external actors in preventing nuclear crises between regional powers.

For deterrence to hold, the international community must reinforce norms against escalation and provide offramps for de-escalation, especially when direct communication between adversaries is limited.

Does this sound familiar? Maybe what Trump is trying to do?

Pakistan’s hope that its nuclear capability would paralyze India’s response did not succeed. India’s willingness to fight showed that nuclear deterrence does not guarantee immunity from retaliation in limited wars. The lesson is that nuclear weapons deter total war but not necessarily all forms of conflict, requiring states to anticipate and prepare for conventional contingencies.

For Pakistan, the military’s dominance over decision-making complicated deterrence dynamics and Nawaz Sharif bowing to US pressure reflected internal disarray, which suggested that deterrence is only as effective as the coherence of the state wielding it. I think there are direct parallels to Ukraine, here.

The Kargil War flirted with a nuclear exchange, but it ultimately stayed conventional due to a mix of restraint, deterrence, and diplomacy....exactly what we are trying to do in ending the war in Ukraine.
Let me first be clear, I know you are well-informed in this area so don’t take any of my sparring as any disrespect. And, of course your response is well-informed and provides a solid analysis if the stability-instability paradox relative to regional nuclear conflicts. I honestly agree with a lot of what you’ve said, but I think there’s a misunderstanding of the original point. The argument wasn’t that Kargil itself is a perfect analog for modern U.S. nuclear deterrence policy - it’s that nuclear deterrence does not eliminate conflict, but instead shapes the ways in which states engage in conflict (whether through limited wars, proxy engagements, or hybrid tactics).

I completely agree that Kargil is a textbook example of stability-instability dynamics, where nuclear deterrence prevented full-scale war but allowed for lower-level military action. But that’s exactly why it’s relevant to a discussion of Russia/Ukraine: we see similar patterns where nuclear deterrence constrains escalation but doesn’t prevent aggression altogether.

You’re right that Kargil was regional, but I totally disagree if you are suggesting that mean its lessons are irrelevant. If anything, Kargil reinforces why nuclear deterrence doesn’t work in a vacuum- it interacts with conventional strategy, political leadership, and shall we say crisis management. The parallels to Ukraine exist in how nuclear deterrence creates room for sub-nuclear aggression, whether through conventional military action or hybrid tactics including ones I mentioned before and in some cases in which US-Russia have been engaged essentially without a break for decades.

Maybe the most important point I want to make is that I’d argue that Trump’s approach to Ukraine isn’t exactly about deterrence- it’s about de-escalation. Deterrence is about maintaining credible threats to prevent escalation, whereas Trump’s approach seems to be more about pressuring Ukraine to negotiate under the assumption that a prolonged war increases nuclear risk. That’s a different framework entirely, whether it’s effective is another debate. I think you can tell I am highly dubious.

As far as my reading list- honestly I really dont profess any expertise- I specialized in South Asian studies in UNDERGRAD over 20 years ago. Sorry to disappoint but I can’t offer much there without doing some serious digging in my attic.

Anyway, thanks for humoring my amateur conjecture
 
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Let me first be clear, I know you are well-informed in this area so don’t take any of my sparring as any disrespect. And, of course your response is well-informed and provides a solid analysis if the stability-instability paradox relative to regional nuclear conflicts. I honestly agree with a lot of what you’ve said, but I think there’s a misunderstanding of the original point. The argument wasn’t that Kargil itself is a perfect analog for modern U.S. nuclear deterrence policy - it’s that nuclear deterrence does not eliminate conflict, but instead shapes the ways in which states engage in conflict (whether through limited wars, proxy engagements, or hybrid tactics).

I completely agree that Kargil is a textbook example of stability-instability dynamics, where nuclear deterrence prevented full-scale war but allowed for lower-level military action. But that’s exactly why it’s relevant to a discussion of Russia/Ukraine: we see similar patterns where nuclear deterrence constrains escalation but doesn’t prevent aggression altogether.

You’re right that Kargil was regional, but I totally disagree if you are suggesting that mean its lessons are irrelevant. If anything, Kargil reinforces why nuclear deterrence doesn’t work in a vacuum- it interacts with conventional strategy, political leadership, and shall we say crisis management. The parallels to Ukraine exist in how nuclear deterrence creates room for sub-nuclear aggression, whether through conventional military action or hybrid tactics including ones I mentioned before and in some cases in which US-Russia have been engaged essentially without a break for decades.

Maybe the most important point I want to make is that I’d argue that Trump’s approach to Ukraine isn’t exactly about deterrence- it’s about de-escalation. Deterrence is about maintaining credible threats to prevent escalation, whereas Trump’s approach seems to be more about pressuring Ukraine to negotiate under the assumption that a prolonged war increases nuclear risk. That’s a different framework entirely, whether it’s effective is another debate. I think you can tell I am highly dubious.

As far as my reading list- honestly I really dont profess any expertise- I specialized in South Asian studies in UNDERGRAD over 20 years ago. Sorry to disappoint but I can’t offer much there without doing some serious digging in my attic.

Anyway, thanks for humoring my amateur conjecture

I think you're making my point for me, maybe accidentally. Ukraine is obviously not a nuclear power, which removes most of the Kargil parallels. They also aren't part of NATO, which highlights my concerns.

Where the Russia/Ukraine War highlights and HIGHLY concerns me is a textbook example of the Nuclear-Conventional Firebreak and the Nuclear Taboo (Please click HERE. It's a really interesting discussion)

From the link above:

Russia has two strategies of nuclear deterrence:

• the first is based on a threat of massive launch‐on‐warning and
retaliatory strikes to deter nuclear aggression

• the second is based on a threat of limited (in terms of targets and
tasks) demonstration and de‐escalation strikes to deter and

terminate a large‐scale conventional war

Russia has “overtaken the United States in the presumed nuclear armsrace by developing and deploying a new generation of nuclearweapons,” including the “very‐low‐yield,” low‐collateral‐damagewarheads that support of Russia’s “de‐escalatory” theater doctrine


This is something I've really tried to hit home & has been discussed academically for years: Russia's low-yield weapons present a problem as far as MAD (it's a non-issue). If they use a 'tactical nuke' (I hate that term), that is very low-yield...it could end a conventional conflict, while preventing us from responding in-kind because our only response is a much higher yield.

i.e. we would not risk an escalation because our potential "response" would be "higher" than their application.

e.g. You throw a small pebble at me, I can only respond by dropping Stone Mountain on you.

That's not an appropriate response. What that link further highlights is the increasingly dangerous probability that a nuclear-power would use a nuclear weapon in a conventional war if the threat of regime change is imminent....i.e. nuke the bastards if we're all going to die, anyway.

The Russia/Ukraine application is that the current "best option" is that Putin dies and/or is overthrown due to overt sanctions and hardships on Russia. Given what I posted above...that's REALLY bad.

IN OTHER WORDS: If we are hoping that Putin gets forced out due to a prolonged war of attrition...then we are only inviting him to use nukes as a last-ditch effort (assuming he doesn't use them because the US/NATO is applying active military force).

NONE of these scenarios are "good" for continued action. Literally, the best action for all involved & to ensure sanity in the process is the quickest resolution towards peace.

Period, dot...end of story.

Putin being an overtly evil authoritarian is irrelevant. He has nukes. A lot of people seem to keep forgetting that and/or not understanding what that implies. I hope my poor summary above partially explains it.
 
That’s total bullshit. No one is celebrating Russia. Do you support us or others sending troops ? Do you support us sending long range weapons ? If not the only other answer is an immediate peace deal. Otherwise it only gets worse for Ukraine.
These DEMS NEVER give any solutions…just whine whine whine and the normal TDS
 
Maybe the most important point I want to make is that I’d argue that Trump’s approach to Ukraine isn’t exactly about deterrence- it’s about de-escalation. Deterrence is about maintaining credible threats to prevent escalation, whereas Trump’s approach seems to be more about pressuring Ukraine to negotiate under the assumption that a prolonged war increases nuclear risk. That’s a different framework entirely, whether it’s effective is another debate. I think you can tell I am highly dubious.
Apologies, I forgot to address this last night (it was getting late ;) )

I'll disagree a bit with your point above

1. Deterrence and De-escalation are inherently intertwined. Deterrence without credible follow-through looks like posturing; de-escalation without firm boundaries looks like surrender. Deterrence builds pressure; de-escalation relieves it. So, it's not 'one or the other'...it's both and not a 'different framework entirely', as least in this context.

(as an aside to the earlier discussion: managing escalation is a key foundation of nuclear deterrence)

2. Trump's bombastic rhetoric historically and with this conflict is inherently a part of deterrence. His desire to end it through a "deal" is inherently de-escalation. He blends both in a way that’s more instinctive than doctrinal.

He largely de-escalates via dealmaking and offering off-ramps to both parties via ceasefires, territorial concessions, and reduced U.S. footprints. He deters via sanctions, military aid, and tough talk which sets the stage by making inaction costly. He ultimately tries to close the deal by giving both sides something they can live with.

The Biden administration tried to use deterrence too via aid (both money and military aid) and sanctions. While the aid has largely allowed Ukraine to survive until now and the sanctions have not been as effective as projected (due in large part to China), the deterrence has failed to end the conflict.

Why? Because of a lack of any real form of de-escalation.

So, while I agree that Trump is using de-escalation, I disagree that he's not also absolutely using deterrence, as well. The de-escalation just looks like a "new framework" because Biden largely ignored it and his deterrence-only approach neither forced nor allowed an acceptable off-ramp for Russia or Ukraine.

***This has been my biggest repeated critique of our Ukraine Support until now: no real strategy or plan for how to end it. Throwing money at the problem and saying mean things about Russia, hoping the war will stop is not a "plan"***
 
You obviously consider Trump is an honorable man who has honorable intentions concerning Putin and Putin's invasion of Ukraine. I just can't share in that if for no other reason than Trump has already called Zelensky a dictator. who started the war with Russia. That alone is enough to make any rational person distrust Trump in a major way. Further, I just can't accept that being on noncombative terms with Russia is a good thing. Trump is fast alienating our western allies in favor of being friends with Russia. I agree with you in keeping Russia and China on neutral terms is an objective worth pursuing. But alienating our western allies and making friends with Putin to do so are not acceptable.

I consider Trump a POTUS with the best interests of the US at the heart of his actions. As I've addressed above, Trump has a long history of using bombastic words to help shape the battlefield (STS). It's not irrational to see that nor is it irrational to want to see it play out.

What is irrational is to continually latch on to completely debunked conspiracy theories regarding Trump and Russia. What is also both irrational and dangerous to argue that being on non-combative terms with a nuclear power is not inherently a 'good thing'.

I also wholly reject that Trump is "alienating" any ally in favor of Russia. Pressuring allies to increase NATO & other military commitments objectively disproves your point, as NATO exists as a deterrent to Russia. You're putting too much value in Trump's words that are aimed to shape negotiations (e.g. what you referenced above) instead of absolute insight into his true aims, like yesterday when he warned Zelensky: "You're gambling with World War III".

The dynamic between Great Powers is a wholly different animal and not as simplistic as critiques of Trump's words suggest. Being on friendly terms with your biggest, most dangerous rivals is inherently a good thing and de-escalates global tension. Does that mean diplomatic, economic, and military pressure shouldn't or won't be applied? Absolutely not. Again, just look at those types of actions that Trump has taken against both Russia & China. It's a very long list used to put the US in better position and to push our rivals to more reasonable actions.

None of that makes or means Trump is trying to be "friends" with Russia (or China) and I'll also point out: Biden's "all stick, no carrot" approach towards Russia clearly did not work and arguably made things worse and pushed Russia towards China. So, I'd suggest maybe giving Trump's approach a chance and not fall for the theatrical narrative that most of his critics employ.
 
Wow, Trump doesn't even try and hide his love for Vlad, and you guys think it is all great.

Russia even had a member of its state media in the Oval to get the good news back to the comrades at home.

What's next, North Korea invades the South, and Trump will go all in for the dictator.

Maybe not, North Korea is not blackmailing our President like Vlad.
Say what?
 
There is a very long history of avoiding crossing the ultimate line by engaging in the sort of proxy actions that we have been conducting in Ukraine. This isn’t radical at all. I suspect I don’t have to break this down for you.
No way. He killed USAID. They were planning to parachute drag queens behind enemy lines.
 
This is a dated high-school level of understanding of Nuclear Deterrence Strategy. I'm not trying to sound arrogant here...but, this is literally what I do, on a daily basis. I've been in this business for almost 21 years.

You are not going to explain anything to me that I'm not intimately aware of at a professional level. Your 'proxy' examples are not functionally relevant for any discussion of modern day nuclear deterrence. The Russia/Ukraine/NATO discussion is barely a nuclear discussion. It touches a dozen other subjects, first.

I can provide a long list of reading material, if you're interested in the subject. I'd love to have a list of your India/Pakistan reading material (honest...not being sarcastic). The Kargil War was a fascinating study...but, not one I'd apply to an applicable study of relevant nuclear deterrence, as far as the US is concerned. Was it intense? Yes. Did it apply extra pressure? Obviously. But, it was a regional nuclear power conflict that largely is not applicable to the US, or how we interact with global Nuclear powers.

If anything, it highlights the issues with the Russia/Ukraine War. Kargil was a textbook example of the stability-instability paradox, where nuclear deterrence prevents large-scale war but emboldens lower-level aggression.

Pakistan’s gamble in Kargil rested on the belief that India would not risk nuclear escalation over a limited incursion. The lesson here is that nuclear weapons can stabilize major conflicts but destabilize smaller ones, as states may exploit the perceived safety net for sub-conventional actions like insurgencies or proxy wars....which is a great example of why Ukraine's only hope of bringing in US/NATO to engage in military action for inevitable escalation is a literal recipe for disaster.

Both India & Pakistan avoided overt nuclear threats, which helped prevent panic or miscalculation. However, the reported movement of Pakistani missiles highlights the risk of ambiguous signaling...showing that nuclear posturing must be carefully calibrated and that ambiguity or aggression can erode deterrence and invite misjudgment.

BIG Lesson here: The U.S. intervention w/ Kargil underscored the importance of external actors in preventing nuclear crises between regional powers.

For deterrence to hold, the international community must reinforce norms against escalation and provide offramps for de-escalation, especially when direct communication between adversaries is limited.

Does this sound familiar? Maybe what Trump is trying to do?

Pakistan’s hope that its nuclear capability would paralyze India’s response did not succeed. India’s willingness to fight showed that nuclear deterrence does not guarantee immunity from retaliation in limited wars. The lesson is that nuclear weapons deter total war but not necessarily all forms of conflict, requiring states to anticipate and prepare for conventional contingencies.

For Pakistan, the military’s dominance over decision-making complicated deterrence dynamics and Nawaz Sharif bowing to US pressure reflected internal disarray, which suggested that deterrence is only as effective as the coherence of the state wielding it. I think there are direct parallels to Ukraine, here.

The Kargil War flirted with a nuclear exchange, but it ultimately stayed conventional due to a mix of restraint, deterrence, and diplomacy....exactly what we are trying to do in ending the war in Ukraine.
leonardo dicaprio bravo GIF

Wow, that was quite well done.
 
We might have actually gotten something done.

Zelensky has a bad habit of this...look at the Minsk II meetings just prior to the invasion. He was uber-arrogant and basically mocked Putin to his face, because he reportedly thought he was a shoe-in for NATO membership.

I consider Trump a POTUS with the best interests of the US at the heart of his actions. As I've addressed above, Trump has a long history of using bombastic words to help shape the battlefield (STS). It's not irrational to see that nor is it irrational to want to see it play out.

What is irrational is to continually latch on to completely debunked conspiracy theories regarding Trump and Russia. What is also both irrational and dangerous to argue that being on non-combative terms with a nuclear power is not inherently a 'good thing'.

I also wholly reject that Trump is "alienating" any ally in favor of Russia. Pressuring allies to increase NATO & other military commitments objectively disproves your point, as NATO's exists as a deterrent to Russia. You're putting too much value in Trump's words that are aimed to shape negotiations (e.g. what you referenced above) instead of absolute insight into his true aims, like yesterday when he warned Zelensky: "You're gambling with World War III".

The dynamic between Great Powers is a wholly different animal and not as simplistic as critiques of Trump's words suggest.
We obviously do not agree on Trump having the best interests of the US at the heart of his actions. The record is replete with counterexamples the most telling being the January 6th fiasco. Calling Zelensky a dictator and claiming that Ukraine started to Ukraine war are just not bombastic words especially after both the House and Senate voted overwhelmingly to support Ukraine in the war. His actions as well as his words represent a total about face of the USA's position on the war. Your comment concerning the dynamic between Great Powers and a critique of Trump's words simply ignores bombastic actions that follow on from his words. It's like Eugene Vindman said; "President Zelensky walked into the White House to discuss Trump's so-called peace plan. Instead, he walked into an ambush."

.
 
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We obviously do not agree on Trump having the best interests of the US at the heart of his actions. The record is replete with counterexamples the most telling being the January 6th fiasco. Calling Zelensky a dictator and claiming that Ukraine started to Ukraine war are just not bombastic words especially after both the House and Senate voted overwhelmingly to support Ukraine in the war. His actions as well as his words represent a total about face of the USA's position on the war. Your comment concerning the dynamic between Great Powers and a critique of Trump's words simply ignores bombastic actions that follow on from his words. It's like Eugene Vindman said; "President Zelensky walked into the White House to discuss Trump's so-called peace plan. Instead, he walked into an ambush."

1. The events of January 6th were chaotic and regrettable, no question. But pinning the entirety of that day on Trump as evidence of his overarching intent ignores the broader context of his presidency, especially as it relates to Russia.

Your response doesn’t specify how January 6th negates my point about Trump’s strategic use of rhetoric or his foreign policy maneuvers. It’s a rhetorical jab rather than a substantive rebuttal. If we’re evaluating Trump’s intent, we need to look at policy outcomes over four years: e.g. economic growth pre-COVID, energy independence, or the Abraham Accords...not a single, emotionally charged event.

Trump’s policies consistently support American sovereignty and economic leverage, even if his style invites controversy. Your post's reliance on January 6th as a silver bullet oversimplifies the question of intent.

2. You claimed (without nuance) that Trump called Zelensky a “dictator” and blamed Ukraine for starting the war, framing those as more than just bombastic words, especially given Congressional support for Ukraine.

Even assuming these statements were made in the manner you imply, I already addressed Trump’s rhetorical style: he uses provocative language to shape negotiations, not to dictate literal policy.

Warning Zelensky about “gambling with World War III” or critiquing his leadership isn’t inherently a policy reversal. It’s a negotiating tactic, one that pressures Ukraine to consider the broader stakes rather than assuming endless U.S. support without conditions.

I also pointed out that Trump pressured NATO allies to increase commitments, which strengthens deterrence against Russia which is an action aligned with supporting Ukraine, even if his words sound harsh.

Trump’s foreign policy often leans on unpredictable rhetoric to unsettle counterparts while advancing U.S. leverage. Your reply doesn’t engage with this dynamic; it just labels the rhetoric as dangerous without showing or proving how it translates to policy betrayal.

3. The claim of a “total about-face” on Ukraine policy doesn’t hold up. You cite Congressional votes to support Ukraine as evidence Trump’s stance contradicts U.S. policy. But Congressional votes don’t dictate executive strategy...they set funding and symbolic gestures, not the tone of diplomacy.

Trump provided lethal aid to Ukraine (like Javelin missiles, a step Obama avoided fwiw), showing significant military support despite rhetoric. Your post ignores this while fixating on Trump’s supposed “actions” post-rhetoric.

What actions? You didn't specify beyond a vague reference to an “ambush” attributed to Vindman. Without details, this feels more like a soundbite than evidence. If we’re talking about Trump’s broader approach, his sanctions on Nord Stream 2 and Russian related or aligned entities (over 700 designations by 2020, per the State Department) hardly suggest a pivot to appease Russia over Ukraine.

4. Your tried to use Vindman’s quote about Zelensky walking into an “ambush” during a White House meeting as proof of Trump’s bad faith. Again, details or support of that is lacking.

Assuming Vindman’s account reflects a tougher-than-expected negotiation, this still fits my original point: Trump plays hardball to reshape dynamics, not to undermine allies for Russia’s benefit.

Your argument assumes this “ambush” proves Trump’s lack of U.S. interest, but it doesn’t explain why. Pressuring Zelensky to consider peace terms or rethink escalation isn’t inherently anti-Ukraine, as it could aim to avoid a wider conflict...which aligns with de-escalation as a U.S. interest.

Again, as I originally noted, being on non-combative terms with nuclear powers like Russia isn’t naive; it’s pragmatic. Great power competition requires balancing deterrence with diplomacy to avoid catastrophic miscalculations. Trump’s approach, however messy, seems to aim for that balance rather than the “all stick, no carrot” failure I noted in Biden’s policy.

Your argument leans heavily on emotional appeals (e.g. January 6th, charged quotes) but doesn’t dismantle my original argument’s core: Trump’s bombast serves a purpose, his actions don’t align with abandoning allies for Russia, and his approach to great powers seeks de-escalation while maintaining pressure. It fails to prove a “total about-face” on Ukraine or refute the strategic intent behind Trump’s rhetoric. If anything, your post doubles down on the theatrical narrative I warned against, clearly showing your missed the forest for the trees.

So, you'd rather "fall for the theatrical narrative that most of his critics employ", rather than consider any other logical argument. Fine, but as I believe I make clear above: You're missing the target.
 
1. The events of January 6th were chaotic and regrettable, no question. But pinning the entirety of that day on Trump as evidence of his overarching intent ignores the broader context of his presidency, especially as it relates to Russia.

Your response doesn’t specify how January 6th negates my point about Trump’s strategic use of rhetoric or his foreign policy maneuvers. It’s a rhetorical jab rather than a substantive rebuttal. If we’re evaluating Trump’s intent, we need to look at policy outcomes over four years: economic growth pre-COVID, energy independence, or the Abraham Accords...not a single, emotionally charged event.

Trump’s policies consistently support American sovereignty and economic leverage, even if his style invites controversy. Your post's reliance on January 6th as a silver bullet oversimplifies the question of intent.

2. You claimed (without nuance) that Trump called Zelensky a “dictator” and blamed Ukraine for starting the war, framing those as more than just bombastic words, especially given Congressional support for Ukraine.

Even assuming these statements were made in the manner you imply, I already addressed Trump’s rhetorical style: he uses provocative language to shape negotiations, not to dictate literal policy.

Warning Zelensky about “gambling with World War III” or critiquing his leadership isn’t inherently a policy reversal. It’s a negotiating tactic, one that pressures Ukraine to consider the broader stakes rather than assuming endless U.S. support without conditions.

I also pointed out that Trump pressured NATO allies to increase commitments, which strengthens deterrence against Russia which is an action aligned with supporting Ukraine, even if his words sound harsh.

Trump’s foreign policy often leans on unpredictable rhetoric to unsettle counterparts while advancing U.S. leverage. Your reply doesn’t engage with this dynamic; it just labels the rhetoric as dangerous without showing or proving how it translates to policy betrayal.

3. The claim of a “total about-face” on Ukraine policy doesn’t hold up. You cite Congressional votes to support Ukraine as evidence Trump’s stance contradicts U.S. policy. But Congressional votes don’t dictate executive strategy...they set funding and symbolic gestures, not the tone of diplomacy.

Trump provided lethal aid to Ukraine (like Javelin missiles, a step Obama avoided fwiw), showing significant military support despite rhetoric. Your post ignores this while fixating on Trump’s supposed “actions” post-rhetoric.

What actions? You didn't specify beyond a vague reference to an “ambush” attributed to Vindman. Without details, this feels more like a soundbite than evidence. If we’re talking about Trump’s broader approach, his sanctions on Nord Stream 2 and Russian related or aligned entities (over 700 designations by 2020, per the State Department) hardly suggest a pivot to appease Russia over Ukraine.

4. Your tried to use Vindman’s quote about Zelensky walking into an “ambush” during a White House meeting as proof of Trump’s bad faith. Again, details or support of that is lacking.

Assuming Vindman’s account reflects a tougher-than-expected negotiation, this still fits my original point: Trump plays hardball to reshape dynamics, not to undermine allies for Russia’s benefit.

Your argument assumes this “ambush” proves Trump’s lack of U.S. interest, but it doesn’t explain why. Pressuring Zelensky to consider peace terms or rethink escalation isn’t inherently anti-Ukraine, as it could aim to avoid a wider conflict...which aligns with de-escalation as a U.S. interest.

Again, as I originally noted, being on non-combative terms with nuclear powers like Russia isn’t naive; it’s pragmatic. Great power competition requires balancing deterrence with diplomacy to avoid catastrophic miscalculations. Trump’s approach, however messy, seems to aim for that balance rather than the “all stick, no carrot” failure I noted in Biden’s policy.

Your argument leans heavily on emotional appeals (e.g. January 6th, charged quotes) but doesn’t dismantle my original argument’s core: Trump’s bombast serves a purpose, his actions don’t align with abandoning allies for Russia, and his approach to great powers seeks de-escalation while maintaining pressure. It fails to prove a “total about-face” on Ukraine or refute the strategic intent behind Trump’s rhetoric. If anything, your post doubles down on the theatrical narrative I warned against, clearly showing your missed the forest for the trees.

So, you'd rather "fall for the theatrical narrative that most of his critics employ", rather than consider any other logical argument. Fine, but as I believe I make clear above: You're missing the target.
I am on a ski trip so I can’t continue to participate in this great discussion, but I think you repeatedly underestimate the effect of Trump’s “bombastic approach” or ill-measured rhetoric. To the extent you estimate it at all, you make a facile implication that he is acting like a fox in negotiation without regard for its long-term impact on out relationship with established allies like our north American neighbors, and Europe. His desire to unsettle is far more successful than you seem to estimate. It isn’t just Russia and Ukraine that are watching.
 
1. The events of January 6th were chaotic and regrettable, no question. But pinning the entirety of that day on Trump as evidence of his overarching intent ignores the broader context of his presidency, especially as it relates to Russia.

Your response doesn’t specify how January 6th negates my point about Trump’s strategic use of rhetoric or his foreign policy maneuvers. It’s a rhetorical jab rather than a substantive rebuttal. If we’re evaluating Trump’s intent, we need to look at policy outcomes over four years: e.g. economic growth pre-COVID, energy independence, or the Abraham Accords...not a single, emotionally charged event.

Trump’s policies consistently support American sovereignty and economic leverage, even if his style invites controversy. Your post's reliance on January 6th as a silver bullet oversimplifies the question of intent.

2. You claimed (without nuance) that Trump called Zelensky a “dictator” and blamed Ukraine for starting the war, framing those as more than just bombastic words, especially given Congressional support for Ukraine.

Even assuming these statements were made in the manner you imply, I already addressed Trump’s rhetorical style: he uses provocative language to shape negotiations, not to dictate literal policy.

Warning Zelensky about “gambling with World War III” or critiquing his leadership isn’t inherently a policy reversal. It’s a negotiating tactic, one that pressures Ukraine to consider the broader stakes rather than assuming endless U.S. support without conditions.

I also pointed out that Trump pressured NATO allies to increase commitments, which strengthens deterrence against Russia which is an action aligned with supporting Ukraine, even if his words sound harsh.

Trump’s foreign policy often leans on unpredictable rhetoric to unsettle counterparts while advancing U.S. leverage. Your reply doesn’t engage with this dynamic; it just labels the rhetoric as dangerous without showing or proving how it translates to policy betrayal.

3. The claim of a “total about-face” on Ukraine policy doesn’t hold up. You cite Congressional votes to support Ukraine as evidence Trump’s stance contradicts U.S. policy. But Congressional votes don’t dictate executive strategy...they set funding and symbolic gestures, not the tone of diplomacy.

Trump provided lethal aid to Ukraine (like Javelin missiles, a step Obama avoided fwiw), showing significant military support despite rhetoric. Your post ignores this while fixating on Trump’s supposed “actions” post-rhetoric.

What actions? You didn't specify beyond a vague reference to an “ambush” attributed to Vindman. Without details, this feels more like a soundbite than evidence. If we’re talking about Trump’s broader approach, his sanctions on Nord Stream 2 and Russian related or aligned entities (over 700 designations by 2020, per the State Department) hardly suggest a pivot to appease Russia over Ukraine.

4. Your tried to use Vindman’s quote about Zelensky walking into an “ambush” during a White House meeting as proof of Trump’s bad faith. Again, details or support of that is lacking.

Assuming Vindman’s account reflects a tougher-than-expected negotiation, this still fits my original point: Trump plays hardball to reshape dynamics, not to undermine allies for Russia’s benefit.

Your argument assumes this “ambush” proves Trump’s lack of U.S. interest, but it doesn’t explain why. Pressuring Zelensky to consider peace terms or rethink escalation isn’t inherently anti-Ukraine, as it could aim to avoid a wider conflict...which aligns with de-escalation as a U.S. interest.

Again, as I originally noted, being on non-combative terms with nuclear powers like Russia isn’t naive; it’s pragmatic. Great power competition requires balancing deterrence with diplomacy to avoid catastrophic miscalculations. Trump’s approach, however messy, seems to aim for that balance rather than the “all stick, no carrot” failure I noted in Biden’s policy.

Your argument leans heavily on emotional appeals (e.g. January 6th, charged quotes) but doesn’t dismantle my original argument’s core: Trump’s bombast serves a purpose, his actions don’t align with abandoning allies for Russia, and his approach to great powers seeks de-escalation while maintaining pressure. It fails to prove a “total about-face” on Ukraine or refute the strategic intent behind Trump’s rhetoric. If anything, your post doubles down on the theatrical narrative I warned against, clearly showing your missed the forest for the trees.

So, you'd rather "fall for the theatrical narrative that most of his critics employ", rather than consider any other logical argument. Fine, but as I believe I make clear above: You're missing the target.
Nice response, certainly better than mine. Apologies for butting in.
 
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I am on a ski trip so I can’t continue to participate in this great discussion, but I think you repeatedly underestimate the effect of Trump’s “bombastic approach” or ill-measured rhetoric. To the extent you estimate it at all, you make a facile implication that he is acting like a fox in negotiation without regard for its long-term impact on out relationship with established allies like our north American neighbors, and Europe. His desire to unsettle is far more successful than you seem to estimate. It isn’t just Russia and Ukraine that are watching.
Please provide concrete examples of ultimately bad diplomatic outcomes due to his rhetoric. I think that overall, unsettling the status quo is a plus, not a minus. Listen to the words of his peers at the end, not during the back & forth. But, you can do that after your trip, enjoy! ;)
 
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Can you imagine a Kamala / Walz admin doing this negotiation? That exchange proves that it would have been more of the same. Billions of US dollars and a thousand lives a week.
They never once mentioned let alone pushed for peace. That should tell you what you need to know about the Libs these days.
 
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We obviously do not agree on Trump having the best interests of the US at the heart of his actions. The record is replete with counterexamples the most telling being the January 6th fiasco. Calling Zelensky a dictator and claiming that Ukraine started to Ukraine war are just not bombastic words especially after both the House and Senate voted overwhelmingly to support Ukraine in the war. His actions as well as his words represent a total about face of the USA's position on the war. Your comment concerning the dynamic between Great Powers and a critique of Trump's words simply ignores bombastic actions that follow on from his words. It's like Eugene Vindman said; "President Zelensky walked into the White House to discuss Trump's so-called peace plan. Instead, he walked into an ambush."
What's your solution? How far are you willing to go?

It's real easy to vote on a resolution that doesn't do anything but say we'd like to see Ukraine come out on top of Putin without any actions. There are no teeth in it. Now do a resolution that leads to sending in our troops in direct conflict with Russia. You won't find much support there on either side of the aisle. Support, at best, means throwing good money after bad until the Ukraine finally collapses in a year or two without a ceasefire.

I don't think there's any support by the US to go fight there. That is a textbook attack on Russian soil by US forces. We've fought proxy wars with them over the years but both countries have been very careful not to attack each others soil because that's not going to end well and could easily escalate to nuclear

Even Biden held back on releasing US weapons systems to target sites inside Russia. We probably help Ukraine with target identification but if we put troops on the ground and have to defend them, this thing will escalate quickly.

Unfortunately after three years, Ukraine is running out of soldiers and Russia is willing to do what they've historically done, sacrifice bodies in exchange for territory. It's just a numbers game that Ukraine can't win without NATO countries, which really means us, putting boots on the ground to shove them back. Trump has exposed the state of EU military capacity after 30 plus years of downsizing with the fall of the USSR. The EU is completely panicked as they should be. They're going to posture about continued support but they aren't going to send in troops in anything other than a ceasefire agreement which Ukraine doesn't want.

Hope is not a strategy and continuing to do what we've been doing will ultimately end up with Russians in Kiev and us having wasted god knows how many billions shipping them weapons they don't have the manpower or skill to use. There is no way in hell we are putting US boots on the ground there. That has never been seriously considered by any administration going back to Crimea in 2014.
 
1. The events of January 6th were chaotic and regrettable, no question. But pinning the entirety of that day on Trump as evidence of his overarching intent ignores the broader context of his presidency, especially as it relates to Russia.

Your response doesn’t specify how January 6th negates my point about Trump’s strategic use of rhetoric or his foreign policy maneuvers. It’s a rhetorical jab rather than a substantive rebuttal. If we’re evaluating Trump’s intent, we need to look at policy outcomes over four years: e.g. economic growth pre-COVID, energy independence, or the Abraham Accords...not a single, emotionally charged event.

Trump’s policies consistently support American sovereignty and economic leverage, even if his style invites controversy. Your post's reliance on January 6th as a silver bullet oversimplifies the question of intent.

2. You claimed (without nuance) that Trump called Zelensky a “dictator” and blamed Ukraine for starting the war, framing those as more than just bombastic words, especially given Congressional support for Ukraine.

Even assuming these statements were made in the manner you imply, I already addressed Trump’s rhetorical style: he uses provocative language to shape negotiations, not to dictate literal policy.

Warning Zelensky about “gambling with World War III” or critiquing his leadership isn’t inherently a policy reversal. It’s a negotiating tactic, one that pressures Ukraine to consider the broader stakes rather than assuming endless U.S. support without conditions.

I also pointed out that Trump pressured NATO allies to increase commitments, which strengthens deterrence against Russia which is an action aligned with supporting Ukraine, even if his words sound harsh.

Trump’s foreign policy often leans on unpredictable rhetoric to unsettle counterparts while advancing U.S. leverage. Your reply doesn’t engage with this dynamic; it just labels the rhetoric as dangerous without showing or proving how it translates to policy betrayal.

3. The claim of a “total about-face” on Ukraine policy doesn’t hold up. You cite Congressional votes to support Ukraine as evidence Trump’s stance contradicts U.S. policy. But Congressional votes don’t dictate executive strategy...they set funding and symbolic gestures, not the tone of diplomacy.

Trump provided lethal aid to Ukraine (like Javelin missiles, a step Obama avoided fwiw), showing significant military support despite rhetoric. Your post ignores this while fixating on Trump’s supposed “actions” post-rhetoric.

What actions? You didn't specify beyond a vague reference to an “ambush” attributed to Vindman. Without details, this feels more like a soundbite than evidence. If we’re talking about Trump’s broader approach, his sanctions on Nord Stream 2 and Russian related or aligned entities (over 700 designations by 2020, per the State Department) hardly suggest a pivot to appease Russia over Ukraine.

4. Your tried to use Vindman’s quote about Zelensky walking into an “ambush” during a White House meeting as proof of Trump’s bad faith. Again, details or support of that is lacking.

Assuming Vindman’s account reflects a tougher-than-expected negotiation, this still fits my original point: Trump plays hardball to reshape dynamics, not to undermine allies for Russia’s benefit.

Your argument assumes this “ambush” proves Trump’s lack of U.S. interest, but it doesn’t explain why. Pressuring Zelensky to consider peace terms or rethink escalation isn’t inherently anti-Ukraine, as it could aim to avoid a wider conflict...which aligns with de-escalation as a U.S. interest.

Again, as I originally noted, being on non-combative terms with nuclear powers like Russia isn’t naive; it’s pragmatic. Great power competition requires balancing deterrence with diplomacy to avoid catastrophic miscalculations. Trump’s approach, however messy, seems to aim for that balance rather than the “all stick, no carrot” failure I noted in Biden’s policy.

Your argument leans heavily on emotional appeals (e.g. January 6th, charged quotes) but doesn’t dismantle my original argument’s core: Trump’s bombast serves a purpose, his actions don’t align with abandoning allies for Russia, and his approach to great powers seeks de-escalation while maintaining pressure. It fails to prove a “total about-face” on Ukraine or refute the strategic intent behind Trump’s rhetoric. If anything, your post doubles down on the theatrical narrative I warned against, clearly showing your missed the forest for the trees.

So, you'd rather "fall for the theatrical narrative that most of his critics employ", rather than consider any other logical argument. Fine, but as I believe I make clear above: You're missing the target

1. The events of January 6th were chaotic and regrettable, no question. But pinning the entirety of that day on Trump as evidence of his overarching intent ignores the broader context of his presidency, especially as it relates to Russia.

Your response doesn’t specify how January 6th negates my point about Trump’s strategic use of rhetoric or his foreign policy maneuvers. It’s a rhetorical jab rather than a substantive rebuttal. If we’re evaluating Trump’s intent, we need to look at policy outcomes over four years: e.g. economic growth pre-COVID, energy independence, or the Abraham Accords...not a single, emotionally charged event.

Trump’s policies consistently support American sovereignty and economic leverage, even if his style invites controversy. Your post's reliance on January 6th as a silver bullet oversimplifies the question of intent.

2. You claimed (without nuance) that Trump called Zelensky a “dictator” and blamed Ukraine for starting the war, framing those as more than just bombastic words, especially given Congressional support for Ukraine.

Even assuming these statements were made in the manner you imply, I already addressed Trump’s rhetorical style: he uses provocative language to shape negotiations, not to dictate literal policy.

Warning Zelensky about “gambling with World War III” or critiquing his leadership isn’t inherently a policy reversal. It’s a negotiating tactic, one that pressures Ukraine to consider the broader stakes rather than assuming endless U.S. support without conditions.

I also pointed out that Trump pressured NATO allies to increase commitments, which strengthens deterrence against Russia which is an action aligned with supporting Ukraine, even if his words sound harsh.

Trump’s foreign policy often leans on unpredictable rhetoric to unsettle counterparts while advancing U.S. leverage. Your reply doesn’t engage with this dynamic; it just labels the rhetoric as dangerous without showing or proving how it translates to policy betrayal.

3. The claim of a “total about-face” on Ukraine policy doesn’t hold up. You cite Congressional votes to support Ukraine as evidence Trump’s stance contradicts U.S. policy. But Congressional votes don’t dictate executive strategy...they set funding and symbolic gestures, not the tone of diplomacy.

Trump provided lethal aid to Ukraine (like Javelin missiles, a step Obama avoided fwiw), showing significant military support despite rhetoric. Your post ignores this while fixating on Trump’s supposed “actions” post-rhetoric.

What actions? You didn't specify beyond a vague reference to an “ambush” attributed to Vindman. Without details, this feels more like a soundbite than evidence. If we’re talking about Trump’s broader approach, his sanctions on Nord Stream 2 and Russian related or aligned entities (over 700 designations by 2020, per the State Department) hardly suggest a pivot to appease Russia over Ukraine.

4. Your tried to use Vindman’s quote about Zelensky walking into an “ambush” during a White House meeting as proof of Trump’s bad faith. Again, details or support of that is lacking.

Assuming Vindman’s account reflects a tougher-than-expected negotiation, this still fits my original point: Trump plays hardball to reshape dynamics, not to undermine allies for Russia’s benefit.

Your argument assumes this “ambush” proves Trump’s lack of U.S. interest, but it doesn’t explain why. Pressuring Zelensky to consider peace terms or rethink escalation isn’t inherently anti-Ukraine, as it could aim to avoid a wider conflict...which aligns with de-escalation as a U.S. interest.

Again, as I originally noted, being on non-combative terms with nuclear powers like Russia isn’t naive; it’s pragmatic. Great power competition requires balancing deterrence with diplomacy to avoid catastrophic miscalculations. Trump’s approach, however messy, seems to aim for that balance rather than the “all stick, no carrot” failure I noted in Biden’s policy.

Your argument leans heavily on emotional appeals (e.g. January 6th, charged quotes) but doesn’t dismantle my original argument’s core: Trump’s bombast serves a purpose, his actions don’t align with abandoning allies for Russia, and his approach to great powers seeks de-escalation while maintaining pressure. It fails to prove a “total about-face” on Ukraine or refute the strategic intent behind Trump’s rhetoric. If anything, your post doubles down on the theatrical narrative I warned against, clearly showing your missed the forest for the trees.

So, you'd rather "fall for the theatrical narrative that most of his critics employ", rather than consider any other logical argument. Fine, but as I believe I make clear above: You're missing the target.
I appreciate your comments and consider them made by a person who has a lot of experience in foreign policy. I also interpret you as a republican which, from where I sit, is fine. I also interpret you as not necessarily being a Trump republican based on the time that you take in your responses and their nature. You do say, "when we’re evaluating Trump’s intent, we need to look at policy outcomes over four years". I just can't do that based on his overall behavior after he found out that "Biden won" the election. It wasn't just the attack on the capital, which was horrendous. it was also his calling the Secretary of State of Georgia attempting to convince him to find enough votes to put him over the top in this critical State. It was also his attempt to convince his Vice President Pence to alter the electoral college votes so he would win. Further, a rather large number of Trump's lawyers have been sanctioned, including Rudy Giuliani, for lawsuits supporting Trump. Their attempts include litigation seeking to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election. In the face of all of these horrendous attempts to overturn the very essence of democracy, I consider Trump as totally unfit to be president and just will not look to what he might have done in the four years that he was called "president" as justification for his current actions. I consider his actions as those of a person at the head of an oligarchy,, which fits beautifully with his creation of DOGE and his appointment of Elon Musk and allowing Musk to run it as he sees fit, and with the Senate and House not even evaluating Musk's actions. There is just no reason to believe that Trump operates in the best interest of democracy. As you say, he probably wants to avoid WWIII but beyond that he is operating without constraints from the other two branches of government.
 
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I appreciate your comments and consider them made by a person who has a lot of experience in foreign policy. I also interpret you as a republican which, from where I sit, is fine. I also interpret you as not necessarily being a Trump republican based on the time that you take in your responses and their nature. You do say, "when we’re evaluating Trump’s intent, we need to look at policy outcomes over four years". I just can't do that based on his overall behavior after he found out that "Biden won" the election. It wasn't just the attack on the capital, which was horrendous. it was also his calling the Secretary of State of Georgia attempting to convince him to find enough votes to put him over the top in this critical State. It was also his attempt to convince his Vice President Pence to alter the electoral college votes so he would win. Further, a rather large number of Trump's lawyers have been sanctioned, including Rudy Giuliani, for lawsuits supporting Trump. Their attempts include litigation seeking to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election. In the face of all of these horrendous attempts to overturn the very essence of democracy, I consider Trump as totally unfit to be president and just will not look to what he might have done in the four years that he was called "president" as justification for his current actions. I consider his actions as those of a person at the head of an oligarchy,, which fits beautifully with his creation of DOGE and his appointment of Elon Musk and allowing Musk to run it as he sees fit, and with the Senate and House not even evaluating Musk's actions. There is just no reason to believe that Trump operates in the best interest of democracy. As you say, he probably wants to avoid WWIII but beyond that he is operating without constraints from the other two branches of government.
You talk about the "best interest of democracy" when you state that you simply find the democratically elected leader to be "unfit."

So your concern isn't really about democracy, it's outcomes.
 
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The idea that Trump “outmaneuvered” Zelenskyy in some master chess game is pure fiction. There was no grand strategy—just political theater designed to rile up a base that values spectacle over substance.
Zelenskyy wasn’t making a “power play.” He was doing what any leader of a nation at war would do: advocating for his country’s survival. He wasn’t there for optics—he brought images of civilians tortured and executed by Russian forces, a brutal reminder of what Ukraine is up against. The war is not an abstract geopolitical struggle—it’s a fight for survival against an authoritarian aggressor who has systematically targeted civilians, kidnapped 19,000 Ukrainian children, and committed mass atrocities. Ignoring this reality isn’t neutrality—it’s willful blindness.

The claim that Trump had to “align with Russia to achieve peace” is absurd. History shows that appeasing aggression doesn’t lead to peace—it leads to more war. When Nazi Germany annexed the Sudetenland in 1938 under the promise of “peace in our time,” it only emboldened further invasion. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is no different. Rewarding Putin with concessions only signals that invasions work, making future conflicts more, not less, likely.

And the idea that NATO membership would automatically mean World War III is blatant fear-mongering. NATO is a deterrent, not a trigger for war. The alliance has successfully prevented major conflicts in Europe for over 70 years. The only reason Ukraine wants NATO membership is because Russia has repeatedly violated their sovereignty. If we truly believe in national sovereignty—the same principle that justified our own independence—then we should respect Ukraine’s right to defend itself and choose its alliances.

What Trump and Vance did wasn’t strategy—it was a diplomatic embarrassment. Instead of standing for the American values of liberty, self-determination, and integrity, they turned a wartime leader’s plea for survival into a partisan spectacle. They weakened America’s credibility on the world stage, signaled to our allies that our commitments are transactional, and gave Putin exactly what he wanted: division and doubt.

The truth isn’t that Trump is playing 4D chess. He’s shown time and again that he lacks the foresight for that. His supporters aren’t watching a brilliant strategist at work—they’re desperately trying to spin a blunder into brilliance.

America has always stood for something bigger than transactional politics. We’ve fought for democracy, defended sovereignty, and stood by those resisting tyranny. That’s not just history—it’s who we claim to be. And if we abandon those principles now, what exactly do we stand for?
 
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The idea that Trump “outmaneuvered” Zelenskyy in some master chess game is pure fiction. There was no grand strategy—just political theater designed to rile up a base that values spectacle over substance.
Zelenskyy wasn’t making a “power play.” He was doing what any leader of a nation at war would do: advocating for his country’s survival. He wasn’t there for optics—he brought images of civilians tortured and executed by Russian forces, a brutal reminder of what Ukraine is up against. The war is not an abstract geopolitical struggle—it’s a fight for survival against an authoritarian aggressor who has systematically targeted civilians, kidnapped 19,000 Ukrainian children, and committed mass atrocities. Ignoring this reality isn’t neutrality—it’s willful blindness.

The claim that Trump had to “align with Russia to achieve peace” is absurd. History shows that appeasing aggression doesn’t lead to peace—it leads to more war. When Nazi Germany annexed the Sudetenland in 1938 under the promise of “peace in our time,” it only emboldened further invasion. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is no different. Rewarding Putin with concessions only signals that invasions work, making future conflicts more, not less, likely.

And the idea that NATO membership would automatically mean World War III is blatant fear-mongering. NATO is a deterrent, not a trigger for war. The alliance has successfully prevented major conflicts in Europe for over 70 years. The only reason Ukraine wants NATO membership is because Russia has repeatedly violated their sovereignty. If we truly believe in national sovereignty—the same principle that justified our own independence—then we should respect Ukraine’s right to defend itself and choose its alliances.

What Trump and Vance did wasn’t strategy—it was a diplomatic embarrassment. Instead of standing for the American values of liberty, self-determination, and integrity, they turned a wartime leader’s plea for survival into a partisan spectacle. They weakened America’s credibility on the world stage, signaled to our allies that our commitments are transactional, and gave Putin exactly what he wanted: division and doubt.

The truth isn’t that Trump is playing 4D chess. He’s shown time and again that he lacks the foresight for that. His supporters aren’t watching a brilliant strategist at work—they’re desperately trying to spin a blunder into brilliance.

America has always stood for something bigger than transactional politics. We’ve fought for democracy, defended sovereignty, and stood by those resisting tyranny. That’s not just history—it’s who we claim to be. And if we abandon those principles now, what exactly do we stand for?
You don’t like Trump which is fine. But facts say otherwise. There was more peace around the world during his administration than anytime I can recall. Including the Abraham accords. So maybe he shouldn’t operate the way America “always has”. Btw I doubt Putin will negotiate with anyone at this point without Trump leading. He certainly wouldn’t have listened to Biden’s Administration. Let’s see how this plays out.
 
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